Much theological debate centers around the doctrine of election. No one debates whether election is biblical, but they do debate the meaning of election. I believe in what is called unconditional individual election (the Calvinistic understanding). Those who oppose my understanding normally believe in some sort of conditional election or corporate election (or a combination of the two; the Arminian understanding). Corporate election is the belief that God elects nations to take part in his plan, not individuals to salvation. So, when Romans 9 speaks of God’s election of Jacob over Esau, Paul is speaking of God’s choosing the nation of Israel to have a special place in salvation history. They will go on to interpret all of Romans 9-11 in light of this assumption.
However, I don’t believe that Romans 9-11 is talking about corporate election, but individual election. Here are eleven reason why:
1. The whole section (9-11) is about the security of individuals. Election of nations would not make any contextual sense. Paul has just told the Roman Christians that nothing could separate them from God’s love (Rom. 8:31-39). The objection that gives rise to chapters 9-11 is: “How do we know that these promises from God are secure considering the current (unbelieving) state of Israel. They had promises too and they don’t look too secure.” Referring to corporate election would not fit the context. But if Paul were to respond by saying that it is only the elect individuals within Israel that are secure (true Israel), then this would make sense. We are secure because all elect individuals have always been secure.
2. In the election of Jacob over Esau (Rom. 9:10-13), while having national implications, starts with individuals. We cannot miss this fact.
3. Jacob was elected and Esau rejected before the twins had done anything good or bad. There is no mention of the nations having done anything good or bad. If one were to say this is nations that Paul is talking about, it would seem that they are reading their theology into the text.
4. Rom. 9:15 emphasizes God’s sovereignty about choosing individuals. “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy.” The pronoun hon (whom) is a masculine singular. If we were talking about nations, a plural pronoun would have been used.
5. Rom. 9:16 is dealing with individuals, not nations. “So, it does not depend on the one who desires or makes effort, but on the mercy of God” (my translation). theolontos (desire) and trechontos (effort) are both masculine singulars that is why it is translated “the one” rather than “those.” (BTW: I don’t like ESV’s translation of this (man’s) as it is misleading and, ironically(!) supporting of corporate election). It is hard to see national implications at all here. It is about individual desire and effort. The acquisition of God’s mercy transcends the ability of man.
6. Once again, Rom. 9:18, speaking in the context of the hardening of Pharaoh, Paul summaries what he is trying to say using masculine singular pronouns: “Therefore, the one God wishes to have mercy on, he has mercy on. The one he wishes to harden, he hardens” (my translation). It would seem that if Paul was merely speaking about national or corporate election, the summary statement would change from Pharaoh to nations (plural), but the summary here emphasizes the sovereignty of God’s will (theleo) over individuals (singular).
7. The objection in Rom. 9:14 makes little sense if Paul were speaking about corporate or national election. The charge of injustice (adikia), which much of the book of Romans is seeking to vindicate God of, is not only out of place, but could easily be answered if Paul was saying that the election of God is only with respect to nations and has no salvific intent.
8. The objection in Rom. 9:18 is even more out of place if Paul is not speaking about individual election. “Why does he still blame people since no one can resist his will.” The verb anthesteken, “to oppose or resist,” is third person singular. The problem the objector has is that it seems unfair to individuals, not corporations of people.
9. The rhetoric of a diatribe or apostrophe being used by Paul is very telling. An apostrophe is a literary devise that is used where an imaginary objector is brought in to challenge the thesis on behalf of an audience. It is introduced with “What shall we say…” (Rom. 9:14) and “You will say to me…” (Rom. 9:19). It is an effective teaching tool. However, if the imaginary objector is misunderstanding Paul, the apostrophe fails to accomplish its rhetorical purpose unless Paul corrects the misunderstanding. Paul does not correct the misunderstanding, only the conclusion. If corporate election were what Paul was speaking of, the rhetoric demands that Paul steer his readers in the right direction by way of the diatribe. Paul sticks to his guns even though the teaching of individual election does most certainly give rise to such objections.
10. Rom. 9:24 speaks about God calling the elect “out of” (ek) the Jews and the Gentiles. Therefore, it is hard to see national election since God calls people “out of” all nations, ek Ioudaion (from Jews) ek ethnon (from Gentiles).
11. In Paul’s specific return the the election theme in the first part of Romans 11, he illustrates those who were called (elect) out of the Jewish nation by referencing Elijah who believed he was the only one still following the Lord. The response from God to Elijah’s lament is referenced by Paul in Rom. 11:4 where God says, “I have kept for myself seven thousand men who have not bowed the knee to Baal.” This tells us two things: 1) these are seven thousand individuals that God has kept, not a new nation. 2) These individuals are kept by God in belief as the characteristic of their “keeping” is their not bowing to Baal (i.e. they remained loyal to God).
12. Using the Elijah illustration in Rom. 11:5, Paul argues that “in the same way,” God has preserved a remnant of believing Israel of which he (as an individual) is a part (Rom. 11:1). This “keeping” in belief of individuals is according to “God’s gracious choice” (11:5).
438 replies to "Twelve Reasons Why Romans 9 is About Individual Election, Not Corporate Election"
Wm,
I need to restate part of my last comment. As I reread what you said above, it sounds like you don’t know if you had any choice. Given what you said you do believe though, it doesn’t sound to me like you could have choice.
Hodge keeps stating that the non elect make their own choices to sin–they do so because it is their will to do so.
I guess what I am trying to find out is if that is what you believe too, and if it is, how does that fit with the way you believe things are determined for you?
Cheryl, simply because God knew from the beginning what I’d be doing now, I know now there was no alternate thing I could be doing.
By your LFW definition of choice, that means I had no choice. By my definition, I had to make tons of choices in order to get here.
To me, this seems to completely eliminate the LFW definition of choice, since we know there are actually choices.
Do you have a rebuttal to the logical argument I presented in comment #179? Which proposition (or logical step) do you reject? If you cannot rebut the argument, you must accept that there is only one actually possible present, from the beginning, and that God knew it. We did NOT have a “choice” to select from multiple possibilities in the LFW sense.
-Wm
Wm,
What I don’t understand is your definition of “choice”. Since you say that things could of happened no other way because of Gods’ command and will, i.e., you could not believe other then what you do, how do you define “choice” in this situtation?
What choice did you actually make when you could not have done otherwise?
Choosing to do the only thing available to do because outside factors have made it the only thing possible to do simply is not choice by any definition I know of and it doesn’t fit a dictionary definition either.
Dictionary definition of choice from here: http://define.com/choice
1. Act of choosing; the voluntary act of selecting or separating from two or more things that which is preferred; the determination of the mind in preferring one thing to another; election.
Michael, the fact that I do not have absolute confidence in my conclusions is indeed due to my awareness that my desires may get in the way. This lack of absolute confidence does not translate into radical skepticism simply because, unlike a naturalist, I can appeal to my transcendent designer, the origin of logic.
The interesting thing about your argument is that it also applies to your own definition of ‘choice’. I admit that I can be sidetracked from proper reasoning by improper desires — but you claim that I can be sidetracked from proper reasoning by transcendent “choices”.
In the end there’s no difference in confidence in reasoning between my system and yours. Both nicely account for the fact that our reasoned conclusions are not infallible. My system has an advantage in that I can examine my heart for improper desires, and if they’re there I can consider whether they might have influenced my reasoning; your LFW cannot be examined. (But of course, one should not adopt a system because it seems more convenient, but rather because it’s true.)
-Wm
WM,
I think you misunderstand the extent of dillemma of your system. As soon as you claim that the universe is engineered in such a way that you cannot believe other than what you do right now (e.g. determism is true) then you have immediately undermined ANY ability to know that what you believe is true. This is not just a matter of ones beliefs not being infallible, but rather that the ultimate likelihood of determism being true is simply 1/the number of possible beliefs on the subject (if in fact anyone has been determined to believe the Truth. Thus while you appeal to a transcendent creator the only reason you believe in a transcendent creator is that you were destined to believe in said creator as while as the nature of that creator. You have no grounds whatsoever if determism is true for believing you were destined to believe the Truth. Remember God destined me to believe that the Arminian understanding of God’s sovereignty is true just as much as he destined you to believe that the Calvinist understanding was true.
In my system beliefs are certainly not infallible, however one is at least able to independently weigh the evidence and arguments and come to a independent conclusion about what the nature of Truth is rather then being simply destined to believe whatever it is that they believe. While I agree that there is fallibility in this system and one cannot be absolutely certain in their own abilities one can certainly be more certain then a system where all beliefs are simply destined.
Free choice on our behalf is only illusion. We feel we make choices, however God has given us the desire to make the choices we do to fulfill his own will and purpose. God does everything, and without him nothing is done that is done. Even is someone kills, God has had them do it. Whether it be good or evil, God is the one who has ultimately had it accomplished. He is in complete control. We really have no choice, even though we feel that we make choices. God is sovereign. What does all this matter anyway. We know God makes one vessel unto honor and another unto wrath. Who cares? Let’s choose to spend our time witnessing to the lost, or something better than discussing a mute point. God had me post this, if you choose to move on to something more interesting it is God’s will. If you choose to continue this discussion, that is God’s will. What will God do? I don’t know.
Cheryl, I know you understand intellectually that LFW is not the only possible definition of “choice”; but above you show that you cannot set it aside even for the sake of discussion.
To answer your question: I chose between two things, one which I desired more and one which I desired less. I do NOT choose between two alternate futures, because only one future actually exists.
That has nothing to do with either of our definitions. The fact that you and I don’t desire to do evil right now doesn’t mean that evil isn’t possible for us; it merely means that we don’t desire evil.
Good.
Two points.
First, the dictionary isn’t demanding that a choice be between two alternate realities or possible futures; it’s between two “things”, or two ACTUAL realities. I can choose between an apple and an orange, and eat ONE of them; I am not choosing between two alternate futures, one with me eating an apple and one with me eating an orange.
Second, the dictionary makes it clear that a choice determines which of the two is preferred. But “preferred” is a past participle; we’re choosing the thing that is already preferred, not a thing that will become preferred after the choice. How is it preferred? Because it is the thing that is in conformance with the chooser’s…
… in conformance with the chooser’s desires.
(Wow, I was CLOSE!)
-Wm
Bible Study,
If God had you post that how do you know that what you posted it true since God is also having me post things which say the opposite of what you say? If we are just writing what God has destined us to write then it is just as likely that I am right and you are wrong as it is vice versa. You can appeal to your feelings or Scripture, but you were just destined to have those feeling and understand Scripture the way that you do as well. You can be no more certain that what you were destined to believe is the Truth then you can be about who is going to win the Presidency in 2040.
Wm,
Right now any way I am not arguing or refuting the steps that you listed in #179. I just want to honestly know how you define “choice” given the statements given there and in comment # 198.
Edit: I didn’t see your last comment before I posted this, so maybe you answered my question.
But William,
How did it get to be in conformance with the chooser’s desires? How did the chooser get those desires? And besides that, you said above that your belief came about because of the will and command of God at this moment. So where do your desires fit in here?
Or do you believe He only wills and commands what is in accordance with what are already your desires? And if that is the case, how can He know that He will be able to accomplish His will and desires unless they are the exact will and desires He has already given you? (Which is of course what Calvin seemed to claim.) And in which case I ask again, how then is it really a person’s choice if the will and desires are implanted in him by God and he only acts in accordance with them?
This whole thing seems hopelessly circular to me!
This is wrong on several levels.
1. There is no ability to “know that what you believe is true”. None whatsoever. By definition you know only what you actually believe; you do not know an additional fact beyond that, stating “what I know now is True.” Thus, I’ve not undermined anything that actually exists.
2. Believing in determinism doesn’t undermine truth. Logic and evidence are guides to truth, and both are fully deterministic. They are guides to truth because our universe was created and designed to communicate truth.
3. I’ve given a proof that there is only one possible future, because God knows it. Your refusal to interact with my written proof, together with your discomfort with the conclusion of the proof, is evidence that you cannot rebut it (since you would if you could).
This computation doesn’t have anything to do with truth. I mean no insult, but it’s just babble expressed using the alphabet of math. False beliefs have zero measure, so they add nothing to the denominator. The “ultimate” likelihood of determinism being true is 1 if it’s actually true, zero if it’s actually not. The immediate likelihood of a proposition being true has to be based on the available evidence, NOT based on a simple count of the number of alternatives to it.
More responses in a moment…
-Wm
WM
1. I don’t know for sure what you mean by number 1 in comment 212. The only thing I can say is that by “true” I mean in accordance with ultimate reality when viewed from an external, objective perspective. For instance I can believe the Sun revolves around the Earth, but when viewed externally this is false. However, since we can’t view our beliefs from an external position and what we believe has been determined by external factors we have no way to evaluate their truthfulness.
2. The system of logic you believe you were determined by external forces to believe as well. The manner in which you weigh the evidence you were also determined to do. There is no neccessity that the logic and evidence you believe be in accordance with ulimate reality. The belief that the universe was designed to communicate truth is itself a affirmative belief which you were determined by external forces to believe – again there is not way to know if this belief is true as you were simply determined to believe it is true.
3. I haven’t interacted with your “proof” because I didn’t see it as a proof. I simply thought you were explicating what you believe and why you believe it.
4. On the math issue you are both right and wrong. When viewed externally from a transcendent perspective you are correct. However, we cannot have that perspective and since we were simply determined to believe what we believe (i.e. the universe is such that you could not be anything other than a Calvinist and me anything other than an Arminian at this moment in time) it is a toss up as to which belief is correct.
4.
I’ve said nothing about being destined in my proof. I’m using only the knowledge of God, not His effectual decree. (I’m doing this because I wanted to use premises on which we agree.) Thus, I’m not claiming any specific cause of my (our) belief in a transcendent creator.
The fact that the future is determined does not establish the cause that determines it. It may possibly be God’s brute force extinguishing of alternative futures; or it may be the simple nature of reality (which God created). Meanwhile, even the ultimate nature of the determination doesn’t establish what it was that determined my personal beliefs. Maybe it was God’s cold impersonal plan; maybe it was God’s warm concern for me; and maybe it was my own personality, desires, and the evidence presented to me.
Of course not. I don’t pretend to be omniscient. And you have no grounds to believe that you’ve lucked out to “Choose” to believe the Truth.
The difference is that I believe that my process of finding truth is governed by my desires; if I examine myself in the light of Scripture, I can find where my desires are morally wrong, and thereby cast a light on a possible source of error in my logic. Your theory about freedom doesn’t provide that ability; because your choices are governed by something outside of your desires, you can never eliminate the source of error. All you can do is run your logic over and over, and hope your Free Will Chooses to make the right Choice more than it Chooses to make the wrong one (for no reason at all).
-Wm
William,
In # 198 you stated in answer to the question asked:
Or put another way still was it the will and command of God that at this moment in time you believe Calvinism to be true?
I don’t know what God’s plan is for the future, but I know that his plan is taking place right now. So yes.
Then in # 207 you state: First, the dictionary isn’t demanding that a choice be between two alternate realities or possible futures; it’s between two “things”, or two ACTUAL realities. I can choose between an apple and an orange, and eat ONE of them; I am not choosing between two alternate futures, one with me eating an apple and one with me eating an orange.
Would not choosing to believe that Calvinism is true at the moment be making a choice between two “things” or “two ACUTAL realities”, not making a choice about the future?
And yet you said that you had to believe that Calvinism was true at this time because of God’s will and command. But how is choosing to believe Calvinism is true or not any different then choosing to eat an apple or an orange?
I truly do not understand your definition of choice. It seems to me that you keep contradicting yourself here.
WM,
1. I’m not sure what you mean by statement 1 in comment 212 for sure. Perhaps to clarify a bit. By the word “true” I mean in accordance with ultimate reality when viewed from an external perspective. For instance one can believe the Sun revolves around the Earth, however when viewed externally this view is false.
2. The system of logic one believe was determined by and external force. The way in which one weighs the evidence was determined by an outside force. Neither of these is neccessarily in conformity with ultimate reality. The statement that the universe was designed to communicate truth is itself and affirmative belief which you were determined to believe and there is no way to know the truth of that belief.
3. The reason I didn’t interact with your “proof” was because I didn’t think it was a proof. I thought you were simply explicating your beliefs. I’ll go back and take a closer look.
4. You are both correct and incorrect on the math issue. You are correct if one is viewing things with an external, transcendent perspective fully cognizant of all the right and wrong answers. However, we do not and can not have that perspective. Thus since all our beliefs were predetermined, we could not believe other than what we do, and the beliefs we were determined to believe are not neccessarily true, it is a complete toss up as to which view on a subject is the true belief. Thus from our perspective there can be no false beliefs – only possible beliefs.
That depends on the thing being chosen. The word “choice” can’t tell us the entire history of every possible choice.
God fulfills His Will by many means, one of which is the desires and deeds of fallen man (and unfallen man, and regenerate man).
How is it a person’s existence if it is entirely due to parents and God? Well, it’s a gift. Thank God for the gift of existence, and thank Him for the gift of desire, and pray that He fulfill them in Himself. Don’t complain simply because you didn’t create yourself, and don’t complain because you didn’t create your desires.
Circular is exactly what it’s not. Everything comes down to God.
LFW is precisely circular: “your” choices are actually chosen by your will, which makes the choices according to its will, according to its will, according to its will… It all either comes down to eternal self-reference, or God, or _nothing_.
-Wm
WM,
On your syllogism.
1. I disagree with statement 2. The concept of Middle Knowledge and conterfactuals enters into that. It is not a contradiction to say that God knows what would be if A was true as well as what would be if A was false. Of course the view one has of time (whether the believe the A theory or B theory) also enters into this
2. I also disagree with your syllogism because it ultimately addresses the wrong issue. Here in this thread we are addressing the concept of determinism. We want to know if the cause and effect nature of the universe along with God’s orchestrations determined inescapably that we would be having this disagreement right now, or if we are trancendently choosing of our own free will to continue this conversation. Your syllogism more addresses God’s foreknowledge and we all agree that he foreknew that we would have the conversation. The issue is whether or not He knows this simply because He can see the future and in that future we would in fact choose of our own free will to have this disagreement or if He orchestrated the universe in a deterministic fashion to ensure that we would have the disagreement.
WM,
“The difference is that I believe that my process of finding truth is governed by my desires; if I examine myself in the light of Scripture, I can find where my desires are morally wrong, and thereby cast a light on a possible source of error in my logic.”
Again “you believe”. You believe because you were destined to believe. This is true of the way you evaluate yourself, the fact you believe Scripture is truthful, the fact you believe your desires are morally wrong, everything. One cannot evaluate or do anything outside what they believe and what they believe (in your system) they were simply destined to believe without regard to the truth of that belief.
William,
So my desires are given me by God so that He can accomplish exactly what he wants to accomplish and it will be done exaclty as He has planned.
So if I desire to murder someone, that desire is given me by God even as Bible Study said above, is that what you are saying? And it is by His will and command that I go do it?
Or if not, how in your understanding does the “gift of desires” work?
This is choosing between the statements “Calvinism is true” and “Calvinism is not true”. Those are the two things. (I shouldn’t have written “two actual realities”; that’s ambiguous and sloppy, and I apologize.)
This was your phrasing, not mine. Don’t parse it too finely; I’ll be responsible for what I wrote, not what you wrote. I agreed because I don’t want to eternally argue over tiny points in grammar. I could have rejected it by pointing out that the reasons I now choose to believe in Calvinism are not the same as the reasons God created me knowing that I would believe in Calvinism right now.
To bring this back to the topic of choosing: I’m choosing to assert “Calvinism is true”. I make that choice, in general, because I desire it more than its negation; in specific, because the evidence for it seems stronger to me than the evidence for its negation. God is using my assertion in order to work His will (He says so), and I hope that He’ll come to me at the end of time and judge me faithful in what I’ve been given. I know He won’t hold me responsible for the outcome of His plan; that’s His job.
I don’t understand this question.
Where? You didn’t point out any contradictions in this message. Why would you accuse me of a logical error without even saying what the logical error was?
-Wm
William,
The question asked by Michael T. was this, Or put another way still was it the will and command of God that at this moment in time you believe Calvinism to be true?
And your answer was yes
I fail to see how I drew an incorrect conclusion by making this statement: And yet you said that you had to believe that Calvinism was true at this time because of God’s will and command.
And here is where it seems to me you contradict yourself. You say what you did was becasue of God’s will and command and that it could not of happened otherwise. And yet you turn around and say you did it because of the reasoning and choice you made yourself because you desire it more then the other choice.
First you say it happened because God did it and you couldn’t do otherwise.
Then you say it happened because it is what you desired.
And you haven’t explained yet how you think the gift of desires works. Do you mean that God just gave us the abiltiy to desire things or did God give you every single desire you have and made some stronger then others either through deliberately orchestrated circumstances or planting them directly in your heart? Maybe the answer to this question will help sort out what I see as contradiction.
Your claim was that I’d undermined the ability to know that what we believe is true. I responded that what we believe is entirely what we believe is true. We don’t “know that what we believe is true”. We can investigate it and try to get more evidence, but that will simply change our beliefs.
Let’s suppose that’s true about my system. But in your system, your beliefs are produced/determined by an internal force (Free Will). Yet reality is external, not internal; God created it. Thus you have no reason to claim that an external force guided by God is less reliable than an internal one unguided by anything except itself. I’ve already given an example of an imaginary world which is completely determined (by the laws of logic) and yet which reaches is not doomed to falsehood.
So what? The important thing about THAT statement is whether it’s true, not whether anyone believes it. If it’s false, none of our discussion can possibly reveal truth (whether you’re right or I’m right); if it’s true, our discussions can possibly reveal truth, whether you’re right or I’m right about free will.
And you DO affirm that statement, as a believer in the Biblical…
Ah! I see. Those are not contradictions; they are both true at the same time, but in different ways. A direct parallel to my statement is Joseph’s saying: “you meant it for evil, but God meant it for good.” I could paraphrase this “you meant it for not-good, but God meant it for good.” If my statement is a possible contradiction, then Joseph’s statement is a true contradiction — in my statement the two halves don’t actually disagree, they merely ascribe the same action to different sources. In Joseph’s statement the two halves are direct opposites.
I CHOSE to do the thing because of my desires, understanding, and reasoning process; yet at the same time, God designed that I do that thing because of His plan and purpose.
Some desires come from my personality; they make up who I am, beyond my ability to change. Others come from my circumstances, beyond my ability to influence. Both of the above categories God gave to me (perhaps working through my parents). Others I inculcated in myself through careful training (or careless repeated sin) — but the desires I chose to strengthen or create, I chose because I desired them to be present in order to attain some earlier desire.
-Wm
WM
1. The statement that we believe what we believe is true is nothing more then a truism. Of course this is the case for if we believed it was false we would believe otherwise. The point in the discussion is that determism is self-defeating because it logically undermines ones ability to claim to know ultimate reality with any certainty whatsoever (i.e. the truth value of the claim “God is good” must be a complete unknown even though you believe it to be true) since the beliefs one has were determined for them without regard to whether or not that belief is ultimately true.
2. “Thus you have no reason to claim that an external force guided by God is less reliable than an internal one unguided by anything except itself.”
The point is that if there is this external force which is determining our beliefs we can’t know which is true. If we independently observe the laws of nature and logic, independently weight the physical and philosophical evidence, and of our own free will make a decision upon that we can have a higher degree of confidence that our belief is correct. This is because at the very least we can be certain that we are observing real reality when we observe laws of logic for instance, rather than simply seeing in reality what the external force has determined us to see to ensure that we would come to the belief that external force has determined for us. However, if you are stating that there is still uncertainty in the system then of course you are correct and I do not deny it. I simply deny that there is no certainty as there is in the case of a determistic system.
This is completely incoherent logically.
The truth of falsehood of a belief doesn’t depend on how I reached it. It only depends on whether it corresponds with reality.
Because bare physcial laws don’t care about whether man ever believes true things, a physcialist has to admit that his philosophy denies any possibility of knowing true things.
Because God does care about whether man believes true things, and because I know that God controls what man believes, I know that there is a possibility of knowing true things.
-Wm
3. I’ve already given an example of an imaginary world which is completely determined (by the laws of logic) and yet which reaches is not doomed to falsehood.”
Of course one can create a imaginary world where their beliefs are true. I can think of a world where Islam is correct, or Buddism, or whatever. Scientists can predict what a universe would be like if various constants (i.e. the ratio of matter to antimatter or the gravitational constant) were different then what they are. The question is whether or not ones views are correct in the real world.
4. “The important thing about THAT statement is whether it’s true, not whether anyone believes it.”
Wrong! The important questions is not whether or not it is true directly, but whether or not we can have any certainty whatsoever of the truth value of that statement (which of course I affirm to answer your question – however in my system the way I believe I came to that belief is quite different then in your system). If determinism is true ultimately the only answer one can give is “I believe it to be true, but have no idea whatsoever whether or not it is actually true.”
1. “The truth of falsehood of a belief doesn’t depend on how I reached it. It only depends on whether it corresponds with reality.”
Of course this is true. However, you are on the wrong question. The question was not whether or not the truth or falsehood of a belief depends on the method by which we came to believe it (to claim this would be to commit the genetic fallacy), rather it is whether or not we can have any degree of certainty that the belief is question is true or false.
2. “Because bare physcial laws don’t care about whether man ever believes true things, a physcialist has to admit that his philosophy denies any possibility of knowing true things.”
This is true, but I’m not sure what you think it proves. I asserted as much by bringing up the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism earlier. To elucidate – If all our perceptive skills are the result of a random process who sole determining factor is that those traits which aid survival are passed on we should have no reason to think that our perceptive abilities accurately portray reality to us since it is fully possible for inaccurate perceptions to aid in survival.
3. Because God does care about whether man believes true things, and because I know that God controls what man believes, I know that there is a possibility of knowing true things.
These are again affirmative beliefs which you have been determined by external factors to believe. You cannot know with ANY degree of certainty their truth value.
I’d like to know what you assert as true to replace statement 2. I know of three major possibilities: (1) Molinism, in which God created the best possible world out of all the possible worlds; (2) Open Theism, where God created the best possible starting world based on middle knowledge and is constantly tuning the results based on human’s reactions.
It sounds like you’d deny Molinism, since it requires a single knowable future. I don’t claim that you’re an open theist (that would be the fallacy of false dilemma), just that I don’t know what your beliefs are.
Second point in a second reply…
-Wm
WM,
All that one has to believe for 2 to be replaced is that God has Middle Knowledge and that counterfactuals exist. This does not necessarily entail a wholesale belief in Molinism or the Neo-Molinist strain of Open Theism. As I have said before I reject Open Theism wholesale. I am still exploring Molinism. As you (I think rightly) have pointed out it doesn’t seem to answer some of the issues it claims to answer. However, I’m still reading material related to it as I personally only became aware of this view less than a year ago so I’m holding judgment for the moment.
I should rephrase the above to be more accurate. I had vaguely heard of Molinism a number of years ago in very broad brush strokes, but only became aware of some of the specifics recently.
But my syllogism does explicitly address determinism.
That’s why I constructed it — because I concluded that we agree on all the premises. You claim to disagree with premise 2 (Which I labeled Omniscience, although our disagreement will probably force me to relabel it, since it would be dishonest for me to force you to deny a point labeled “omniscience” when you don’t actually deny God’s omniscience).
The point is that IF God knew from the beginning that we’d have this conversation, THEN the course of the universe was determined from the start. It doesn’t matter how it’s determined; only THAT it’s determined. It doesn’t even matter whether man is in some way transcendent; only that God somehow transcends man.
-Wm
WM,
“The point is that IF God knew from the beginning that we’d have this conversation, THEN the course of the universe was determined from the start. It doesn’t matter how it’s determined; only THAT it’s determined. It doesn’t even matter whether man is in some way transcendent; only that God somehow transcends man.”
I disagree with this statement entirely. Simple knowledge of what will happen does not logically entail that that action was determined. God simply knows what we will use our free will to choose, the choices themselves are unrestrained. If we were to choose to use our free will to do the opposite God would have known this as well. God knows both the factual and the counterfactual of our decisions. Simply because he knows which one is the factual does not indicate that he willed or determined that factual to come about.
William,
From #223: Some desires come from my personality; they make up who I am, beyond my ability to change. Others come from my circumstances, beyond my ability to influence. Both of the above categories God gave to me (perhaps working through my parents). Others I inculcated in myself through careful training (or careless repeated sin) — but the desires I chose to strengthen or create, I chose because I desired them to be present in order to attain some earlier desire.
Thanks for your explanation. I’m still trying to really grasp this though. That last group of deisres you spoke about, the ones you chose to strengthen or create, they were not influenced by God or given you by God but somehow came from your own choice alone?
Let’s see, #2 was “2. God does not know both a fact and its contradiction at the same time and in the same way. (Law: Non-Contradiction)”
Wait, are you actually questioning the law of non-contradiction? Was that a typo and you meant to question something else? That’s one of the three fundamental axioms of logic.
Perhaps you meant to question #4, “An event that in fact happens would contradict the fact of the event happening otherwise. (Definition: Event Contradiction)”. Is that possible to question? (It’s certainly the most awkwardly phrased!) Questioning that might allow you to allow multiple alternate (contingent) futures. The replacement would have to be carefully phrased, probably in multiple parts.
Or perhaps you want to insert a new premise that I can’t elucidate. I started with the formal definition of middle knowledge, which is “those facts which are neither necessary, nor dependent on God’s will for their truth.” But this argument doesn’t refer to God’s will, nor to necessity; so I don’t see how a premise based on this would fit into the argument at all.
Let me build a simpler argument; perhaps you can see a problem.
0. We are having this discussion.
1. God knew we would have this discussion from the beginning.
2. God’s knowledge does not fail.
3. Therefore this discussion could not fail to happen.
-Wm
Excellent question. Yes, I had to choose to strengthen those (or weaken others). But, why did I choose to do that? I had some previously existing desire. And that previously existing desire fell into one of those three categories — but at some point early enough in my life, there must have been none of the third category, since it takes time to change the strength of a desire (when it’s possible).
And of course, there is one or more desires that are maximal — there is no desire stronger — so that I cannot want to change them. There may also be desires that although I could want to change them, none of the stronger desires is of a nature to cause me to want to change them.
-Wm
William,
Given what you have explained above about hos you understand a person’s desires to work, it would seem to me that there may be only a few of those desires that you can really attribute to yourself. Or is that a false assumption?
And if those desires that are really yours conflicts with something God wants to be done does He not then change them to accomplish His will?
WM,
On your new argument. This argument again only addreses God’s foreknowledge. It does not show in the slightest why God’s foreknowledge logically must equate with determinism. Sure God knows what will happen, but why does he know. The question is not whether or not your syllogism is true (I agree that it is valid), but rather why is it true. Is Number 2 (in your new syllogism) true because God determined that we have this discussion or because he simply foreknew what we would use our free will to do? Ultimately I think there is a hidden number 5 in you syllogism which is “therefore determism is true” and it is this that I believe to be non-sequitar.
In any case this doesn’t address in the slightest my objection that one is unable to know anything with ANY degree of certainty should determinism be true.
WM,
Just to reiterate. The question is not did God know we were going to have this conversation. Rather the question is did He will and determine that we were going to have this conversation?
William,
Just another thought here. In past discussions on P and P regarding this very issue, someone–I think maybe Hodge–kept saying that we chose but we can only chose in accord with our nature. Do you agree or disagree with that? Remember, we have no choice over our nature is it comes to us at birth.
Let me ask you a completely different question to provide the answer.
Do you attribute goodness to God? Righteousness? Holiness? Sovereignty? Love? Immutability? I think the answers to these are all “yes”. Now, did God create any of those attributes within Himself? The answer is clearly “no” — God has always been like that.
In the same way, my attributes (including my desires) are mine; even though I didn’t make them, they belong to me. So all of my desires are truly mine, just as my body is truly mine even though I didn’t make it.
-Wm
Cheryl: yes, we can only choose within our nature.
-Wm
If I can show that this conversation could not have happened otherwise, then I’ve disproven libertarian free will. That’s my goal in that particular thread.
-Wm
WM,
“If I can show that this conversation could not have happened otherwise, then I’ve disproven libertarian free will. That’s my goal in that particular thread.”
From the LFW position it could’ve happened otherwise. We could’ve chosen not to have this coversation. There was no external force (cause and effect or God) which lead to us having this coversation. We chose of our own free will to have and continue having this conversation. We could have just as easily chosen otherwise. Simply because God knew which we choose does not imply determinism. Had we chosen the counterfactual God would’ve known that as well (as well as what would’ve happened if that counterfactual were true).
Ulimately your argument is this.
1. God knows what choices we will make
2. Therefore LFW is false.
I fail to see how this follows.
That’s the problem — God knew about this conversation, not about its opposite. Therefore we could not have chosen otherwise; if we had chosen otherwise, God’s knowledge, which existed from time long before this conversation, would be false.
(I would agree there was no external force; what drove us was our own desires.)
Unless you switch to open theism, you have to admit that God’s knowledge preexists our choices; therefore, at the time we make them, our choices have only one possible outcome (the one God actually knew).
This is why Open Theism originated — to attempt to make sense of LFW.
-Wm
Yes.
The desire that you acted on to murder was indeed given to you by God. Many people murder out of rage, which was given by God, although it was intended and commanded to be used for different purposes.
Let’s put it this way: are there any crimes that God can’t do anything about? I’d say “no”. God is in control. Nobody gets killed without God’s permission; nobody’s death is in vain.
It’s against His revealed will and command; but He will use the fact that you’re trying to disobey Him to work out His will in the plan of salvation which will bring every one of His elect to Him, and will keep them securely there, according to His words.
-Wm
The desire that you acted on to murder was indeed given to you by God. Many people murder out of rage, which was given by God, although it was intended and commanded to be used for different purposes.
So you are saying that if God gives someone rage and they use it to murder someone, the desire itself–the rage–was actually given by God, but the person didn’t use it as God intended?
So the murder wasn’t God’s plan–only the rage He gave the man but then He took the murder that wasn’t His plan and used it for some other purpose?
Am I understanding what you are saying? But if that is the case, doesn’t that contradict what you first said in your last comment that He gives us our desires so that He can accomplish exactly what He wants accomplished?
1. You say God gives our desires so He can do exactly what He has planned in the way He planned.
2. Then you say He gave a desire but it was used for a different purpose then He commanded and intended. But then He uses the results to accomplish His will.
Is there not a contradiction there?
Does He indeed give desires to be used for what He planned, in exactly the way He planned, so that we can do things differently then what He commanded and intended so that what He commanded and intended could in fact be done? (Now there is a mouthful if I ever heard one!) 🙂
I am still just trying to figure out what you really believe about determinism because it still seems to me that you are contradicting yourself. At least you are if I am understanding what you are saying.
I must say you seem to have a very complex theology!
I’m really trying hard to grasp your point, honest. It’s just not making sense to me. And I understand the argument quite well; I’ve used it. The problem is that it only works if your opponent asserts that our beliefs are the end result of purposeless forces.
Okay, you’re now describing some kind of brain-in-a-jar system, where our free wills are being imprisoned by a deity who feeds us false information in order to force us to come to false conclusions according to his will.
This is not what I’ve ever said. Our conclusions are utterly predictable based on a knowledge of our desires, our natural thought processes, and the experiences we’re going to have. Because of those things, God can control what our conclusions will be based on the experiences we have and how He creates our natural thought processes and desires. Yet at the same time, God promises that all men know that God the creator exists, and they all “suppress the truth in unrighteousness”.
God promises to conform those who believe in Christ to His image.
-Wm
I’m now announcing that I’m coming out of retirement. Just kidding. I don’t want to get back into it, but wanted to clarify something. I’ve been following the discussion still.
Michael,
The Neo-Theist argument is in an overly simplistic form the following:
God sees that Michael will do action X on October 12, 2010 before Michael ever exists. He has perfect knowledge that Michael will do action X. He does not cause it, but knows that it, and nothing else, will be chosen by Michael on October 12, 2010.
Now, the world is made, and many, many years later, Michael comes to the choice of either to do action X or action Y. Does Michael have LFW to do action Y instead of action X, or does what God had foreseen many, many years ago, before Michael ever existed, have to be done by Michael? Can Michael make any other choice than the one that God foresaw before Michael existed? That’s the problem. He can’t. He has to make that one. He cannot make another. God foresaw it many years ago, and so now that he’s come to the decision, he CANNOT choose otherwise.
I think that’s what William is trying to get at.
If it’s still difficult, think Minority Report.
Cheryl,
I’ve yet to see you grapple with 1 Kings 22 that I have brought up numerous times now. Is God the cause for sending the evil spirit who then lies to the king that then causes the king to believe the false prophets and go up to war so that he dies?
OK, I’m out. 🙂 Pax
WM,
1. “That’s the problem — God knew about this conversation, not about its opposite. Therefore we could not have chosen otherwise; if we had chosen otherwise, God’s knowledge, which existed from time long before this conversation, would be false.”
This basically just restates what you have said before. I still don’t see how it logically follows from this that LFW is false. The simple foreknowledge, even infallible foreknowledge, does not logically lead to the conclusion that one did not make a free choice. Like I said if we had used our free will to not have this conversation God would known this as well.
2. “Unless you switch to open theism, you have to admit that God’s knowledge preexists our choices; therefore, at the time we make them, our choices have only one possible outcome (the one God actually knew).”
This actually depends on whether one has a A-Theory or a B-Theory of time. My understanding (and in full disclosure this is one of the things I am researching right now because I don’t fully understand the theory of time so my “understanding” is admittedly limited – I’m always amazed at the rabbit trails even a narrowly focused question leads one down) is that if one has a B-Theory of time God’s knowledge of our choices and our choices occur simultaneously since God is a timeless being external to time itseft who sees history all at once. To us they appear to occur in the present, but to God there is no past, present, or future. It all happens at once. This is where I think open theism went wrong (and actually Bill Craig as well – he’s one of the few Christian Philosophers who holds to the A Theory). The view God as in time rather than external to time seeing all of history at once.