Much theological debate centers around the doctrine of election. No one debates whether election is biblical, but they do debate the meaning of election. I believe in what is called unconditional individual election (the Calvinistic understanding). Those who oppose my understanding normally believe in some sort of conditional election or corporate election (or a combination of the two; the Arminian understanding). Corporate election is the belief that God elects nations to take part in his plan, not individuals to salvation. So, when Romans 9 speaks of God’s election of Jacob over Esau, Paul is speaking of God’s choosing the nation of Israel to have a special place in salvation history. They will go on to interpret all of Romans 9-11 in light of this assumption.
However, I don’t believe that Romans 9-11 is talking about corporate election, but individual election. Here are eleven reason why:
1. The whole section (9-11) is about the security of individuals. Election of nations would not make any contextual sense. Paul has just told the Roman Christians that nothing could separate them from God’s love (Rom. 8:31-39). The objection that gives rise to chapters 9-11 is: “How do we know that these promises from God are secure considering the current (unbelieving) state of Israel. They had promises too and they don’t look too secure.” Referring to corporate election would not fit the context. But if Paul were to respond by saying that it is only the elect individuals within Israel that are secure (true Israel), then this would make sense. We are secure because all elect individuals have always been secure.
2. In the election of Jacob over Esau (Rom. 9:10-13), while having national implications, starts with individuals. We cannot miss this fact.
3. Jacob was elected and Esau rejected before the twins had done anything good or bad. There is no mention of the nations having done anything good or bad. If one were to say this is nations that Paul is talking about, it would seem that they are reading their theology into the text.
4. Rom. 9:15 emphasizes God’s sovereignty about choosing individuals. “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy.” The pronoun hon (whom) is a masculine singular. If we were talking about nations, a plural pronoun would have been used.
5. Rom. 9:16 is dealing with individuals, not nations. “So, it does not depend on the one who desires or makes effort, but on the mercy of God” (my translation). theolontos (desire) and trechontos (effort) are both masculine singulars that is why it is translated “the one” rather than “those.” (BTW: I don’t like ESV’s translation of this (man’s) as it is misleading and, ironically(!) supporting of corporate election). It is hard to see national implications at all here. It is about individual desire and effort. The acquisition of God’s mercy transcends the ability of man.
6. Once again, Rom. 9:18, speaking in the context of the hardening of Pharaoh, Paul summaries what he is trying to say using masculine singular pronouns: “Therefore, the one God wishes to have mercy on, he has mercy on. The one he wishes to harden, he hardens” (my translation). It would seem that if Paul was merely speaking about national or corporate election, the summary statement would change from Pharaoh to nations (plural), but the summary here emphasizes the sovereignty of God’s will (theleo) over individuals (singular).
7. The objection in Rom. 9:14 makes little sense if Paul were speaking about corporate or national election. The charge of injustice (adikia), which much of the book of Romans is seeking to vindicate God of, is not only out of place, but could easily be answered if Paul was saying that the election of God is only with respect to nations and has no salvific intent.
8. The objection in Rom. 9:18 is even more out of place if Paul is not speaking about individual election. “Why does he still blame people since no one can resist his will.” The verb anthesteken, “to oppose or resist,” is third person singular. The problem the objector has is that it seems unfair to individuals, not corporations of people.
9. The rhetoric of a diatribe or apostrophe being used by Paul is very telling. An apostrophe is a literary devise that is used where an imaginary objector is brought in to challenge the thesis on behalf of an audience. It is introduced with “What shall we say…” (Rom. 9:14) and “You will say to me…” (Rom. 9:19). It is an effective teaching tool. However, if the imaginary objector is misunderstanding Paul, the apostrophe fails to accomplish its rhetorical purpose unless Paul corrects the misunderstanding. Paul does not correct the misunderstanding, only the conclusion. If corporate election were what Paul was speaking of, the rhetoric demands that Paul steer his readers in the right direction by way of the diatribe. Paul sticks to his guns even though the teaching of individual election does most certainly give rise to such objections.
10. Rom. 9:24 speaks about God calling the elect “out of” (ek) the Jews and the Gentiles. Therefore, it is hard to see national election since God calls people “out of” all nations, ek Ioudaion (from Jews) ek ethnon (from Gentiles).
11. In Paul’s specific return the the election theme in the first part of Romans 11, he illustrates those who were called (elect) out of the Jewish nation by referencing Elijah who believed he was the only one still following the Lord. The response from God to Elijah’s lament is referenced by Paul in Rom. 11:4 where God says, “I have kept for myself seven thousand men who have not bowed the knee to Baal.” This tells us two things: 1) these are seven thousand individuals that God has kept, not a new nation. 2) These individuals are kept by God in belief as the characteristic of their “keeping” is their not bowing to Baal (i.e. they remained loyal to God).
12. Using the Elijah illustration in Rom. 11:5, Paul argues that “in the same way,” God has preserved a remnant of believing Israel of which he (as an individual) is a part (Rom. 11:1). This “keeping” in belief of individuals is according to “God’s gracious choice” (11:5).
438 replies to "Twelve Reasons Why Romans 9 is About Individual Election, Not Corporate Election"
We freely choose to ignore the evidence which would influences our moral reasoning and thus leads to the corruption of our moral reasoning.
Wait a moment. Freely? That perhaps begs the question. How about we start by agreeing that we _willfully_ choose? Then we can ask what that means: WHY do we so choose?
A compatibilist would say we always have a purpose, including when we ignore evidence: for example(s), one might be laziness (paying attention to evidence takes work), another might be dislike of change (the evidence might require changing a cherished belief), another might be greed (the evidence might be in someone else’s favor) and still another might be dislike of consequences (the evidence might be that there is a God and I’m not honoring Him).
Do free-will choosers NOT have purposes when they ignore evidence? I don’t know what it feels like to make a free-will choice; I’ve never observed myself in that situation. I always have some kind of cause for my final decision. I can explain it, and I consider it an objectively good decision and explanation if when I explain it, the person I’m talking to decides the same way. Would that make sense if I believed in free will? It doesn’t seem that way to me; I’d expect the person to decide freely, not constrained by MY explanation.
-Wm
Michael, I recognize that the ‘insanity defense’ is a useful touchstone for your argument, but I want to spend some time going over the normal course of law. I’ll respond to your argument, but I do want you to look over my arguments above, and see if you can agree that normally, the law says that intent plus commission equals guilt.
I emphasize this because this is thousands of years old, and very well established. NO court has ever required the prosecution to prove that the accused “could have chosen otherwise” in any libertarian sense.
The insanity defense, on the other hand, is fairly new, and its effects so far are not pretty, even though the theory behind it is humane. C.S. Lewis, of course, is famous for condemning the insanity defense’s HUGE flaw: it gives the condemned into the hands of the state not for a just punishment, but until the state or experts decides he’s cured, which can be indefinite.
As a compatibilist, I would rather have a proper sentence for the crime be given, and allow the condemned to plead that he be given treatment in addition to the punishment — and that the expense will be worth it to the state and society. This way, if the condemned decides that the cure is unjust, he can simply demand that the cure stop, since justice can still be fulfilled.
But I digress.
Keep in mind, though, as a background: the insanity defense is rarely used, almost never successful, and when it is, it’s HUGELY controversial. The public HATES it.
You were saying: However many states, and most legal scholars and psychologists hold that one is not guilty by reason of insanity when there actions are the result of a “irresistible impulse” (the test often used is whether or not the defendant would have still committed the crime if a police officer were standing right next to him).
That hasn’t been US Federal law since Hinkley got off on an insanity plea — Congress changed the law due to public outcry.
But the idea there of…
(Ow, this reply was way too long. I got cut off before I even started answering your question.)
That hasn’t been US Federal law since Hinkley got off on an insanity plea — Congress changed the law due to public outcry.
But the idea there of an irresistible impulse is one where the person actually willed to NOT do the action because they wanted to do right, but found themselves doing the action anyhow. This is NOT what any theory of will proposes, even illusionism; thus, you’d have to struggle to associate it with one.
In order to make a plea under this test, the accused must say that they knew it was wrong, actually intended not to do it, but found themselves doing it anyhow.
This test therefore can’t reveal anything about any theory of willing, because it checks for a sickness that operates at a more powerful level than the will of the accused.
In your system our natures are determined by God, our natures control our will, and our will deterministically controls our actions. Thus all of our actions are ultimately an “irresistible impulse”.
Not in that sense, no. I claim that our actions are chosen by our will, which operates according to our desires. The mentally sick person with the “irresistible impulse” has a compulsive action override their willing; this is why they call it irresistible. If it were in accordance with their conscious desires it wouldn’t be resisted and thus wouldn’t seem irresistible.
-Wm
I had claimed that your morally reasoning robot was being compelled rather than acting compatibly, and you replied:
A. I disagree here. People choose to do things they know are wrong all the time myself included. According to compatibilism God has determined that they will do this. Thus he has determined that they go against their own moral reasoning
First, your robot isn’t *merely* doing something it knows is wrong. It’s simply directly contradicting its own moral reasoning. Imagine your robot desired fuel; it knew that it should attempt to keep going to do its job; then it would therefore not refuel. Unlike us, it’s not obeying its desires at the expense of its moral law; it’s actually disobeying everything to do something it doesn’t want.
Second, doing something you know is wrong is the result of moral reasoning; it’s not a contradiction of moral reasoning. You do it because in your moral reasoning you place your invented moral laws above God’s, and your desires above God’s commands.
B. Just as an exercise let me change the scenario just slightly. God creates the robot with defective moral reasoning such that it will inevitably reach the conclusion that killing Jews is not only a morally permissible action, by a moral obligation. The robot is further programmed to follow all actions it believes to be morally obligatory and thus tries to exterminate every Jew in the world.
Your question is, “is this robot a moral agent”. Assuming everything we’ve agreed, yes. And it’s culpable for its actions, and a look at its mens rea will confirm that it actually intended to commit the actions of mass murder, and would do so again. I would add something I missed mentioning in most of my past comments: the robot’s programmer is also compatibly responsible. I don’t have a good intuition for that, since we don’t in fact deal with that situation in our daily life, but let’s suppose that the programmer would be held 100% to account for the…
(I was saying:) let’s suppose that the programmer would be held 100% to account for the exact same actions, as though the moral agent were an inert tool. (This seems plausible to me.)
So after the robot’s trial, God is brought before the tribunal, and asked the same questions as were established for the robot: “Did you intend this catastrophe?” Next He is asked: “What moral laws were you following in order to cause these deaths?” He is then asked, “What, if any, purpose did you have in causing these deaths?” And finally, He is asked: “Is there any evil that can possibly come from your causing these deaths?” I can briefly answer these questions from the Bible; can you predict what they are?
C. 1. Is a defective moral agent still a moral agent?
Yes. If not, we’re not moral agents. In a real sense, every finite being is defective.
Furthermore if God is simply using evil for the greater good one must wonder if the actions are truly evil.
This is an important point, but you’re pretending that God’s intentions are the same as the agent’s committing the act. God intended Christ’s crucifixion, and so did the Jewish leaders; does this mean that Judas and the Jewish leaders intended it for the same reason that God did?
John 6 says that Jesus knew who would betray Him. Couldn’t Jesus have sent Judas away to reduce the temptation? Acts 2 says that the crucifixion was according to God’s predeterminate plan. Doesn’t this mean that God intended — and Jesus actually knew — that Judas specifically would do this TERRIBLE sin?
Did God excuse Judas because God’s plan specified him as the one who would deliver Jesus over?
-Wm
WM,
1. I’m sure you are well aware that Arminian’s have different interpretations of those passages. While I know you don’t buy those interpretations (otherwise you’d be an Arminian) I do.
2. “Many effective people do use a decisionmaking algorithm to help them make “better” choices”
A algorithm they’ve come up with, not one which was forced upon them. That is the key difference.
3. “WHY do we so choose?”
LFW does not imply that there are not factors which influence our choice. At the same time LFW does posit that those factors only “influence” our choices and do not mechanistically determine them. In other words our choices are to some extent or another transcendent as I’ve stated before.
4. The underlying assumption of most criminal justice systems is that we have libertarian free will and we freely choose to commit the crimes we commit. Now there are no doubt factors which influence ones proclivity towards crime. Yet we do not assume that those factors deterministically cause one to commit a crime. If one was simply fated to commit a crime one could not be blameworthy for that crime.
5. “Unlike us, it’s not obeying its desires at the expense of its moral law; it’s actually disobeying everything to do something it doesn’t want.”
No I have simply programmed it to desire to do that which is wrong. Thus whatever conclusions it reaches about what is good it will desire not to do.
6.. “Your question is, “is this robot a moral agent”. Assuming everything we’ve agreed, yes.”
And here is where we part company and I think most people would agree. Basically you are denying the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (which is ultimately what semi-compatibilism does). The funny thing is that principle is exactly what Justin Martyr was articulating in the quote i posted earlier, as well as a number of other Early Church Fathers (Irenaeus, Methodius, etc.).
7. “So after the robot’s trial, God is brought before the tribunal…”
If the answers are as I suspect then the robots actions were not actually evil. Even though the robot thought he was doing evil and intended for its actions to be evil that is irrelevant. The actions he took were good. Think back to the law. If I intend to help an old lady across the street thinking it unlawful and evil I’m still not going to be prosecuted for a crime even though I thought I was committing one.
8. Our understandings of how things work with regards to the Crucifixion are drastically difference. Did God know what would happen? Of course. Did He actively work to ensure that Judas or the Jewish leaders would be evil? Absolutely not.
Back on Nov 1, Michael said:
“1. I’m sure you are well aware that Arminian’s have different interpretations of those passages. While I know you don’t buy those interpretations (otherwise you’d be an Arminian) I do.”
Well… I have to admit that was a blunder on my part. Nobody should ever simply post Bible verses and pretend to have made a point. I apologize.
“A [decisionmaking] algorithm they’ve come up with, not one which was forced upon them. That is the key difference.”
I’m not proposing the use of any force; you are incorrect to use that term. But that’s a side point. Your claim was that being non-free would make decisions ineffective. Let me give you a counterexample. I work for the government as a contractor; as such, I follow a process they call “acquisition” (just kidding; a better link would be “acquisition“). I do not have free will NOT to use that process when I’m involved in something that the government defines as acquisition. Does that mean that all my acquisition decisions are ineffective, uncertain, or wrong?
“4. The underlying assumption of most criminal justice systems is that we have libertarian free will and we freely choose to commit the crimes we commit.”
I’m disappointed that you would simply dismiss the evidence I’ve attempted to use to show that criminal justice assumes a compatibilist view of free will, and you wouldn’t cite a scrap of evidence. As I’ve explained, until the modern concept of “insanity” no recorded criminal justice system has ever attempted to formulate a test that shows whether a person “could have done otherwise” or met any other distinctive criterion of LFW; but they do build tests which meet distinctives of semi-compatibilism (that culpability depends only on doing the deed and wanting to do the deed).
Furthermore,…
(…)
Furthermore, whenever the modern idea of insanity is known to have been used, there is ALWAYS a popular revolt; people hate the idea that someone might be considered not guilty even though they did the action and intended to do it.
Now there are no doubt factors which influence ones proclivity towards crime. Yet we do not assume that those factors deterministically cause one to commit a crime.
Nor do we assume that they don’t. We don’t have to — we simply act as though semi-compatibilism were true, such that it doesn’t matter whether LFW is true or not.
If one was simply fated to commit a crime one could not be blameworthy for that crime.
Fate isn’t the same as determinism. A fated crime would lack mens rea, by the way.
-Wm
“No I have simply programmed it to desire to do that which is wrong. Thus whatever conclusions it reaches about what is good it will desire not to do.”
Would it be fair for me to assume the following: the robot knows “thou shalt not murder” is a moral law (along with other moral laws), but the robot desires to violate moral laws, as such.
“And here is where we part company and I think most people would agree. Basically you are denying the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (which is ultimately what semi-compatibilism does).”
Of course I am. Are you aware that you’re directly begging the question? You’re actually telling me that I’m wrong, simply because my assumptions fail to lead directly to your assumptions. My assumptions contradict your assumptions; only one of us is correct.
“If the answers are as I suspect then the robots actions were not actually evil. Even though the robot thought he was doing evil and intended for its actions to be evil that is irrelevant. The actions he took were good.”
No — the robot knows murder is evil, and therefore finds an innocent person in order to willfully kill him. Did I miss a crucial point of your scenario or something?
“8. Our understandings of how things work with regards to the Crucifixion are drastically difference. Did God know what would happen? Of course. Did He actively work to ensure that Judas or the Jewish leaders would be evil? Absolutely not.”
That “absolutely” is an unwarranted assumption that strikes at the heart of this discussion, of course. When Peter says that Jesus was handed over by the predetermined plan and foreknowledge of God, what does he mean? When he goes on to say “you executed Him” and “Jesus whom you crucified”, they respond with obvious guilt and distress, even though Peter just said that His death was God’s predeterminate plan.
It really seems that Peter intended to tell the people that Jesus’ crucifixion was God’s…
(I came SO CLOSE! I was saying:)
It really seems that Peter intended to tell the people that Jesus’ crucifixion was God’s plan, AND that the people were guilty of it, in a compatiblist manner. I admit that Peter might have meant something else — do you have a proposed meaning for this?
-Wm
1. “Fate isn’t the same as determinism. A fated crime would lack mens rea, by the way.”
What is the difference between fating that someone commit a crime and fating that someone desire to commit a crime which deterministically causes them to commit a crime?
2. “Would it be fair for me to assume the following: the robot knows “thou shalt not murder” is a moral law (along with other moral laws), but the robot desires to violate moral laws, as such.”
That is more or less correct. I programmed the robot to be able to reason morally in the same way that a human reasons morally. I then programmed it to desire to do that which is evil such that it would deterministically do the opposite of which it believed to be morally good.
3. “Of course I am. Are you aware that you’re directly begging the question? You’re actually telling me that I’m wrong, simply because my assumptions fail to lead directly to your assumptions. My assumptions contradict your assumptions; only one of us is correct.”
No I’m not begging the questions. Rather I’m stating that denying the Principle of Alternate Possibilities seems to go directly against something many in the Early Church stated as being necessary for moral responsibility. You aren’t wrong because you don’t agree with me. Rather the fact that you seem to be directly contradicting the writings of no less the four Early Church Fathers in the first 300 years causes one to wonder how a Christian could deny this.
4. No — the robot knows murder is evil, and therefore finds an innocent person in order to willfully kill him. Did I miss a crucial point of your scenario or something?
Yet if God has willed the murder from all eternity with the intent of using that murder to accomplish His plan how is the murder really evil?? When all the facts are known will it not in fact be a good thing that Hitler murdered millions of Jews since without that God’s perfect will could not have been accomplished?
5. On Acts 2. I’m not sure how it is logically follows from the fact that God planned for Christ to die that the individual acts of those involved were also predetermined. I mean I’ll admit that your interpretation here is possible. I just don’t see how it is necessitated by this passage. Furthermore, this seems at the end of the day to be another facet of the debate Calvinists and Arminian’s have over God hardening Pharaoh’s heart works. Same idea different situation.
Have you guys read the latest post by Michael Patton that involves Calvinism “where the rubber meets the road”? It is about the possiblity of marrying the wrong person.
Michael said (while assuming my position for the sake of argument): “Yet if God has willed the murder from all eternity with the intent of using that murder to accomplish His plan how is the murder really evil?”
Ah! Yes, you’re saying that ultimately all acts are good, since they have good consequences. The problem is that this isn’t how evil is defined. Evil is a corruption of good, and because there can be no corruption of ultimate good, there is no ultimate evil. But this doesn’t mean that there is no evil.
Crime in specific and evil in general is both an action and a mental state: in fact, the mental state is the crucial one of the pair, as shown by the 1st and 10th commandments (and as shown by Christ’s preaching on all the other commandments). This is, I believe, why all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags before God: He sees our heart and knows the reason we’re doing them.
Anyhow, therefore, the murder is “really” evil not because it’s ultimately evil, but rather because it’s evil. And the murderer is really guilty not because he intended and executed an ultimate evil, but because he intended and executed evil.
God, on the other hand, by intending and executing His plans (including that murderer’s crime in them) is not intending or executing evil, but rather is intending and executing ultimate good.
-Wm
“What is the difference between fating that someone commit a crime and fating that someone desire to commit a crime which deterministically causes them to commit a crime?”
Fatalism is impersonal and incompatibilist. A fated action will be performed regardless of the person’s desire. An action performed without criminal desire isn’t a crime; one without sinful desire isn’t a sin.
Looks like we agree on our poor robot’s situation, by the way. What do you think of my scenario regarding bringing God into court, above? Do you think those are reasonable questions, and ones that can be answered from the Bible? I do.
“No I’m not begging the questions. Rather I’m stating that denying the Principle of Alternate Possibilities seems to go directly against something many in the Early Church stated as being necessary for moral responsibility. You aren’t wrong because you don’t agree with me. Rather the fact that you seem to be directly contradicting the writings of no less the four Early Church Fathers in the first 300 years causes one to wonder how a Christian could deny this.”
I’ve interacted briefly with your claims about one of them (I pointed out that he appears to be addressing fatalists, not protocalvinists). I don’t know what you’re going to claim about the other three. It’s extremely risky to import ancient authors into modern discussions; you have to carefully look at their context to see what they’re actually trying to deny, rather than assuming they’re trying to affirm your viewpoint.
-Wm
On Acts 2: it’s undeniable that Judas’ acts were predetermined, from John 6. It’s not clear for all the others, but it is clear for him.
But look at Peter’s argument. He says that God preplanned Christ’s death, and at the same time he heaped blame for it on all present. They had minor roles in the death itself, but they responded with pleas for repentance. So Peter is blaming them for a specific event which God had planned and determined all along, and they are agreeing that they are to blame.
My point is: how does Peter’s argument fit into your theory? A compatibilist would be very comfortable assigning blame for God’s planned event to everyone who participated in it. An incompatibilist would seem to have to be very uncomfortable with that, though. Right?
Or… If not… Wouldn’t this suggest that God’s preplanned crucifixion of Christ might not happen, if all the people nearby chose of their own free will to not participate in it?
-Wm
WM,
Going to reply quickly and then I’m probably going to have to quit this conversation – I have 2 weeks to get a summary judgment opposition brief together so I’ll be a tad busy.
1. My argument is not that all things are good because they have good consequences. Rather my argument is that all things are good because God has willed them to be. If God is truly a being of maximal and ultimate goodness he cannot will anything that is truly evil. As a result evil only exists from our perspective.
2. “Fatalism is impersonal and incompatibilist. A fated action will be performed regardless of the person’s desire. An action performed without criminal desire isn’t a crime; one without sinful desire isn’t a sin.”
Fatalism can be this, but not necessarily. Your system just expands things by making ones will and nature fatalistically determined such that they actually desire to commit the actions they commit. So instead of simply the actions being fated the actions as well as ones mental state in committing those actions has been fated (you know it’s odd that I once heard a Calvinist pastor refer to the whole Esau/Jacob debacle as “fate” – in fact I think Caedman’s Call refers to this as fate in a song as well).
3. On hauling God into Court
God would be guilty of murder. Our Court systems do not recognize that the ends justify the means. The questions you ask of God are irrelevant. The only relevant questions are 1) did you kill John Doe??, and 2) did you intend to kill John Doe? Whether or not you intended for something good to come out of John Doe’s death (e.g. his kids would be free of an negative influence in their lives and come to know God and become missionaries that would convert hundreds of people) is irrelevant. Hitler thought killing all the Jews would bring about good results too.
4. On ancient writers.
A. The people who these writers were addressing were various. Most of the time it was the Gnostics which had significant variation in their beliefs. Some likely did believe in pure fatalism
B. Ultimately who they were addressing is irrelevant, it is rather what they were addressing, which was various forms of determinism. What makes their response relevant is their way of addressing them was almost to verbatim recite the Principal of Alternative Possibilities, something Calvinism must deny.
5. I honestly find nothing in John 6 or Acts 2 which is not fully explained by God choosing to actualize this universe as opposed to any other. God knew from all eternity the free choices individuals would make if he chose to actualize this universe including how Judas, and everyone else would respond to Jesus.
Michael, good luck with getting the case ruled on favorably.
In reply to:
1: Unfortunately, although evil is not ultimate, neither is it an illusion. The Bible teaches this in many places. And that what God means for good people can do for evil also is described. I’ll content myself to cite Josephs’s famous saying, and although you may not need to read it as implying compatibilism, you can’t deny that that the same thing the brothers meant for evil (and was in fact evil) was also meant by God for good (and was good).
2: You can define “fatalist” to mean anything you wish. It ceases to be a negative description when you define it positively, though.
3: I said nothing about the ends justifying the means. That’s a straw man. I said that the human doing the killing is the one whose desire is to kill an innocent person, not God. God does not desire to kill an innocent person; death is the penalty for sin, and is earned the instant the sin occurs. In addition, it occurs to me that as creator, God does have the right to kill humans, directly or by proxy; He will do so justly in all cases, but He has the right regardless.
4B: If we’re going to go into interpretation, let’s pick ground rules. I’d say that the authors you cite should be saying something that’s grounded on at least apostolic authority, and preferably should be saying something about something scriptural. I understand my responsibility to not introduce novel doctrines, so I do respect what you’re doing here… But interpreting fallible speakers is just as hard as interpreting Scripture, and less rewarding.
5: Yes. That’s God’s eternal decree. But my point wasn’t merely that God had decreed everything before time (actually, I’m not even sure about that; you’re more determinist than I am), but that Peter assigned blame to the crowd for the exact same event that Peter said was God’s predetermined plan, and the people accepted the blame.
-Wm
“God intrinsically knows” sounds like you’re saying that it’s in God’s natural knowledge exactly what this real universe is; but that means that the way the universe is now is necessary to God. That means, in turn, that God had to create the universe this way. I’m sure that’s not what you meant, but I don’t know what you actually meant.
God’s knowledge needn’t have intermediary, but it does have to have grounding (correspondence with reality).
…If you do come back, I’ll be watching this thread via RSS. Why not :-). Or you could hop into Paul’s thread; he’ll be back about the same time.
-Wm
when Christ addresses the Churches in rev, is he talking about corporate salvation or individual salvation?
We can argue that Paul is not talking about corporate salvation but fact is that the scriptures used are dealing with nations.
One must harmonize scripture for though one may say that we are chosen we can see that Christ hope was that all would come to know Him.
Matt 23:37
O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, [thou] that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under [her] wings, and ye would not!
Now Christ said YOU WOULD NOT.
If command a man to catch a ball with his hands and he has none, I would be a mad man.
Calvisnims puts forth the notion that the Children of Israel couldnt have turned but Christ says that they couldve. Its plain as day.
People say that the reprobate cannot turn but somehow leave out what the bible says in the first place in scripture that reprobate is mentioned.
Romans 1:28And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient;
They first knew God but rejected Him.
How is it that a man who is a sinner can know God, how is it that sinners can know something is wrong? Calvinist will use the fact the heart of man is totally wicked and say that man cannot turn to God. However scriptures tells us plainly that God has put something in the heart of man though he is wicked.
Romans 2:15Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their CONSCIENCE also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another;)
Ecclesiastes 3:11 He has made everything beautiful in its time. Also He has put eternity in their hearts, except that no one can find out the work that God does from beginning to end.
I second the contention that the ESV is has some major translation errors, and it is the last bible I would use for study purposes.
I amazed at how many people fall all over themselves recommending this translation, its as if they stand to make some money from my purchasing it.
I’ll stick with my old NASB until someone comes up with a better study bible. I also still use my King James for some passages. There are a couple important ones that only the KJV gets right, but I wouldn’t say it gets everything right. (The one major thing it gets right that all the others miss is Revelation 1 where it basically says that the angel gave John these revelations by SIGNS & SYMBOLS. If the rest of the translations would get this passage right instead of only the KJV, we wouldn’t have so many silly people demanding we take these things literally, as many in the dispensational camp do).
In my view, the 11 reasons given here all reflect the individualistic ethos that permeates so much of American evangelical thinking. Paul, a Jew to the core, would have been writing here with a keen sense of the communal and the community at the back of his mind. Further, to speak of the election of nations here, in the NT sense, would not refer to the ethnic groups or races but to the new Israel — the church! It therefore makes more sense to say that Paul was speaking here of corporate election.
Looks like I missed some discussion.
The idea of corporate salvation as presented above is a category error: you’re assuming that corporate entities can be justified by grace or resurrected after death. This aspect of salvation is unique to humans, not to corporate entities. God does promise and threaten corporate entities, but not with the same promises. Jerusalem was cursed to be utterly destroyed (but some were saved from her by the preaching of the apostles, who endured to the end and then ran for the hills). The churches in Revelations were threatened or promised corporate blessings — and in some cases their members were promised personal blessings (or threatened).
Romans 9 breaks it down: the Jews were given a corporate blessing, but not all individuals were blessed.
-Wm
[…] Twelve Reasons Why Romans 9 is About Individual Election, Not Corporate Election | Parchment and Pen __________________ Ephesians 2:8 – For it is by His unmerited favor through faith that you have been saved; it is not by anything that you have done, it is the gift of God. Ephesians 2:9 – It is not the result of what anyone can do, so that no one can boast of it. [Williams NT] […]
[…] The doctrine of election raises many other questions and views. For example, it is popular to argue that Romans 9 (and Ephesians 1) argue for “corporate election.” In other words, some say that Paul doesn’t teach that God selects individuals for salvation but rather selects to within groups. Unfortunately, this is not consistent with Scripture. Again, Dan Wallace offers thoughts. Another theologian offers “12 reasons why Romans 9 is about Individual Election, Not Corporate Election. […]
[…] why Romans 9 is about individual election rather than the Arminian idea of corporate election: Twelve Reasons Why Romans 9 is About Individual Election, Not Corporate Election | Parchment and Pen __________________ "I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help. My […]
Unless you’re a first century Jew, Romans 9 wasn’t written to you. It wasn’t written for you. And it surely wasn’t written ABOUT you.
There is positively NOTHING about individual election in Romans 9 unless your presuppositions put it there for you. Alarmingly, few Calvinists realize where their presuppositions originate; that is, from the strain of Gnosticism specifically known as Manichaeism.
I hate to be “that guy,” Mr. Patton, but you aren’t God’s special little snowflake. Your egocentric, pathetic attempt to distort Scripture to try to convince yourself that you are is, quite frankly, a bit ridiculous.
Herman, your choice to turn to namecalling was unfortunate.
The idea that God looks at individuals as part of His salvation plans isn’t worthy of your namecalling; it’s clearly present in the Bible in the idea of names enrolled in heaven and names written in the Book of Life. The argument implied by your mockery results in a denial of any of that — and of course so long as you only mock rather than stating your position we cannot see what else your position implies.
Let’s rewind and look at some claims you made, though.
//Unless you’re a first century Jew, Romans 9 wasn’t written to you.//
Incorrect — the Christians living in Rome were not Jews, by and large. This is why, after Paul finished explaining in Romans 8 how sure the promises of God are, Paul anticipated the objection that “if God’s promises are so sure, why weren’t all the Jews saved?”.
//It wasn’t written for you.//
That’s possible. But it’s a claim that requires evidence; if you claim it’s really not written FOR us, you need to explain what makes it different from the histories of ancient Israel, which “were written for our teaching, upon whom the ends of the age are come.”
//And it surely wasn’t written ABOUT you.//
You just tried to get rhetorical, and said something that’s false. NONE of the specific examples in Romans 9 are first-century Jews, and about half of them aren’t Jews. Pharaoh’s an Egyptian, Esau is the brother of a patriarch (but not himself Hebrew), Ishmael isn’t Hebrew…
But furthermore, why would Romans 9:25 be exclusively about 1st century Jews? It _looks_ like Paul is trying to say that God is saying something specifically about non-Jews. And then verse 30-31 … it sure _looks_ like Paul is trying to explain why so many Gentiles are saved and so few Jews.
No, your abrupt dismissal is not merited. The specific ideas you’ve expressed about the text are objectively false.
Cheryl is right. Paul was quoting Malachi. Malachi was clearly talking about Esau being rejected as a nation. And not that that was not always the case. Moses commanded Israel not to “scorn” Esau. After Jacob received the birthright, Isaac prophesied that Esau’s descendants would serve Jacob’s for a time, but then would be freed from that bondage. That prophecy was fulfilled exactly as it was described. Further while God prophesied that the younger twin would rule the older twin, He did not prophecy that Esau was bound for hell. Indeed the picture that we get of Jacob and Esau’s meeting is that Esau, after conversing with God, reconciled with his brother and was thus, most likely, reconciled with God. After all “every good and perfect gift comes from God.” Esau would not have had genuine forgiveness in his heart without the grace of God. Further Romans 9:1-10 makes it clear that Paul is talking about nations and NOT individuals. He is lamenting that his people as a NATION had rejected the Messiah. But that didn’t mean all Jewish individuals had. Actually there were many Jewish converts. Early on the majority of Christians were converted Jews. But collectively Jews had rejected Christianity. This, of course, had been predicted by Isaiah. “He came unto His own and His own received Him not.” In verse 27 Paul again comes back the the nation them when he talks about a “remnant of Israel” being saved. That seems odd if Romans 9 was talking about individuals instead of nations. After all, there were already many Jewish converts including Paul himself. Oh, but if you see Romans 9 for what it is, Paul lamenting about the NATION of Israel, then Paul hoping for a remnant of THEM makes perfect sense.
To Wm Tanksley (you’re a Forth programmer aren’t you? I recognize your name). Anyway, you misunderstand Herman’s point. I’ll explain. Yes you are correct that Romans was written largely to Gentile Christians. But the point Paul was making was about the Jewish people as a nation. This is very clear by Paul’s reference to Malachi. In Malachi God was reassuring the Jewish people that He had not forgotten them by pointing out that He had restored them to their homeland but he had not restored the Edomites (Essau) to theirs. In Romans 9 Paul laments that the Jewish people as a nation had rejected Jesus as Messiah, but at the end he expressed hope that a remnant of those still in darkness would see the light.
John, it’s good to hear from a fellow Forth programmer — yes, that’s me. It’s been a while since Usenet…
The problem is that Paul’s argument in Romans 9 isn’t about the nations, but rather about the brothers, and more specifically, it’s about the brothers while they were in their mother’s womb, before they’d done anything good or bad.