There are many words and concepts in theology that suffer from misunderstanding, mis-characterization, and misinformation. “Predestination,” “Calvinism,” “Total Depravity,” “Inerrancy,” and “Complementarianism”, just to name a few that I personally have to deal with. Proponents are more often than not on the defensive, having to explain again and again why it is they don’t mean what people think they mean.

The concept of “free will” suffers no less with regard to this misunderstanding. Does a person have free will? Well, what do you mean by “free will”? This must always be asked.

Do you mean:

  1. That a person is not forced from the outside to make a choice?
  2. That a person is responsible for his or her choices?
  3. That a person is the active agent in a choice made?
  4. That a person is free to do whatever they desire?
  5. That a person has the ability to choose contrary to their nature (who they are)?

Calvinists, such as myself, do believe in free will and we don’t believe in free will. It just depends on what you mean.

When it comes to the first three options, most Calvinist would agree that a person is not forced to make a choice, is responsible for their choices, and is the active agent behind those choices. They would reject the forth believing that a person is not free to do whatever they desire (for example, no matter how much one desires, he or she cannot read the thoughts of another person, fly without wings, or transport from one location to another just by thinking about the desired location).

It is important to note at this point, there is no conflict. No matter what theological persuasion you adhere to, most of historic Christianity has agreed that the first three are true, while the fourth is false.

It is with the fifth option there is disagreement.

Does a person have the ability to choose against their nature?

This question gets to the heart of the issue. Here we introduce a new and more defined term (hang with me here): “Libertarian Free-will” or “Libertarian Freedom.” Libertarian freedom can be defined briefly thus:

Libertarian Freedom: “The power of contrary choice.”

If you ask whether a person can choose against their nature (i.e. libertarian freedom) the answer, I believe, must be “no.” A person’s nature makes up who they are. Who they are determines their choice. If there choice is determined, then the freedom is self-limited. Therefore, there is no “power” of contrary choice for we cannot identify what or who this “power” might be. I know, I know . . . slow down. Let me explain.

First, it is important to get this out of the way. To associate this denial of libertarian freedom exclusively with Calvinism would be misleading. St. Augustine was the first to deal with this issue in a comprehensive manner. Until the forth century, it was simply assumed that people were free and responsible, but they had yet to flesh out what this meant. Augustine further elaborated on the Christian understanding of freedom. He argued that people choose according to who they are. If they are good, they make good choices. If they are bad, they make bad choices. These choices are free, they just lack liberty. In other words, a person does not become a sinner because they sin, they sin because they are a sinner. It is an issue of nature first. If people are identified with the fallen nature of Adam, then they will make choices similar to that of Adam because it is who they are. Yes, they are making a free choice, but this choice does not include the liberty or freedom of contrary choice.

What you have to ask is this: If “free will” means that we can choose against our nature (i.e. the power of contrary choice), if “free will” means that we can choose against who we are, what does this mean? What does this look like? How does a free person make a choice that is contrary to who they are? Who is actually making the choice? What is “free will” in this paradigm?

If one can choose according to who they are not, then they are not making the choice and this is not really freedom at all, no? Therefore, there is, at the very least, a self-determinism at work here. This is a limit on free will and, therefore, a necessary denial of true libertarian freedom.

Think about all that goes into making “who you are.” We are born in the fallen line of Adam. Spiritually speaking we have an inbred inclination toward sin. All of our being is infected with sin. This is called “total depravity.” Every aspect of our being is infected with sin, even if we don’t act it out to a maximal degree.

But even if this were not the case,—even if total depravity were a false doctrine—libertarian freedom would still be untenable. Not only are you who you are because of your identification with a fallen human race, but notice all these factors that you did not choose that go into the set up for any given “free will” decision made:

  • You did not choose when you were to be born.
  • You did not choose where you were to be born.
  • You did not choose your parents.
  • You did not choose your influences early in your life.
  • You did not choose whether you were to be male or female.
  • You did not choose your genetics.
  • You did not choose your temperament.
  • You did not choose your looks.
  • You did not choose your body type.
  • You did not choose your physical abilities.

All of these factors play an influencing role in who you are at the time of any given decision. Yes, your choice is free, but it has you behind them. Therefore, you are free to choose according to you from whom you are not able to free yourself!

Now, I must reveal something here once again that might surprise many of you. This view is held by both Calvinists and Arminians alike. Neither position believes that a person can choose against their nature. Arminians, however, differ from Calvinists in that they believe in the doctrine of prevenient grace, which essentially neutralizes the will so that the inclination toward sin—the antagonism toward Gog—is relieved so that the person can make a true “free will” decision.

However, we still have some massive difficulties. Here are a couple:

A neutralized will amounts to your absence from the choice itself.

Changing the nature of a person so that their predispositions are neutral does not really help. We are back to the question What does a neutralized will look like? Does it erase all of the you behind the choice? If you are neutralized and liberated from you, then who is making the choice? How can you be held responsible for a choice that you did not really make, whether good or bad?

A neutralized will amounts to perpetual indecision. Think about this, if a person had true libertarian freedom, where there were no coercive forces, personal or divine, that influenced the decision, would a choice ever be made? If you have no reason to choose A or B, then neither would ever be chosen. Ronald Nash illustrates this by presenting a dog who has true libertarian freedom trying to decide between two bowls of dog food. He says that the dog would end up dying of starvation. Why? Because he would never have any reason to choose one over the other. It is like a balanced scale, it will never tilt to the right or the left unless the weights (influence) on one side is greater than the other. Then, no matter how little weight (influence) is added to a balanced scale, it will always choose accordingly.

A neutralized will amounts to arbitrary decisions, which one cannot be held responsible for.

For the sake of argument, let’s say that libertarian choice could be made. Let’s say that the dog did choose one food bowl over the other. In a truly libertarian sense, this decision cannot have influences of any kind. Any decision without influences is arbitrary. It would be like flipping a coin. I chose A rather than B, not because of who I am, but for no reason at all. It just turned out that way. But this option is clearly outside a biblical worldview of responsibility and judgment. Therefore, in my opinion, the outcome for the fight for true libertarian free-will comes at the expense of true responsibility!

In conclusion: while I believe in free will, I don’t believe in libertarian free will. We make the choices we make because of who we are. We are responsible for these choices. God will judge each person accordingly with a righteous judgment.

Is there tension? Absolutely. We hold in tension our belief in God’s sovereignty, determining who we are, when we live, where we will live, who our parents will be, our DNA, etc. and human responsibility. While this might seem uncomfortable, I believe that it is not only the best biblical option, but the only philosophical option outside outside of fatalism, and we don’t want to go there.

Acts 17:26-28
“From one man he made every nation of men, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and he determined the times set for them and the exact places where they should live. 27 God did this so that men would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us. 28 ‘For in him we live and move and have our being.’”

Thoughts? Do you believe in free will?


C Michael Patton
C Michael Patton

C. Michael Patton is the primary contributor to the Parchment and Pen/Credo Blog. He has been in ministry for nearly twenty years as a pastor, author, speaker, and blogger. Find him on Patreon Th.M. Dallas Theological Seminary (2001), president of Credo House Ministries and Credo Courses, author of Now that I'm a Christian (Crossway, 2014) Increase My Faith (Credo House, 2011), and The Theology Program (Reclaiming the Mind Ministries, 2001-2006), host of Theology Unplugged, and primary blogger here at Parchment and Pen. But, most importantly, husband to a beautiful wife and father to four awesome children. Michael is available for speaking engagements. Join his Patreon and support his ministry

    414 replies to "A Calvinist’s Understanding of “Free-Will”"

    • Rey Reynoso

      Jake Blues (47) has a good point. I think Calvinists would have to put a decision to submit to God in a different category (while citing 1Corinthians 1). It is a category not accessible by flesh alone but needs individual Divine intervention.

      As to Lisa Robinson (48) if the prevenient grace as commonly portrayed by Calvinists (ie: creating a tabula rasa that can therefore choose between to equal choices) is individually oriented, then yes, it’s essentially the same thing as Calvinistic regeneration. If prevenient grace is something else, something corporately oriented (as in toward all humanity as a whole) that is constantly revealing the grace of God without depending on individuals then it wouldn’t be contradictory at all. Nor would it be Pelagian or even Semi-Pelagian.

    • It seems to me that CMP completely bypassed one of the most important objections made in this thread by bossmanham regarding the choice of Adam to sin in the garden. I think it explodes the entire C argument. Adam was created “good’ by nature and yet did something that was clearly not “good” in disobeying God. It seems to me that the only explanation is that the power of alternative choice was basic to Adam’s “nature”. So when we make a free choice we are choosing according to our nature in that part of our nature includes the ability to choose freely. The other explanation would be that God caused Adam to sin and then punished him and his posterity for a sin that God caused him to do and then out of “love” and “mercy” decided to “save” some of those God Himself put into such an unavoidable situation.

      I think one needs to also be aware of the fact that when it is said that free will is incoherent one must even deny God the power of contrary or alternative choice. In that case not even God is free (and truly God is not free to do certain things, like lie for example). If we strip God of all freedom since God cannot do that which is incoherent, then we are faced with some very alarming consequences. God was not free to not create the universe. God had to create the universe (had no choice). He did it of necessity. That means He had to create you and me (talk about man centered!). Worse yet, if you are one of the “elect” then God had no choice but to choose you for salvation! He could not have passed you over instead. He chose you of necessity. If that is the case then the Calvinist notion of grace is exploded too. They can no longer claim that God “didn’t have to save anyone, but was gracious to save a few”. Not to mention how such things threaten God’s aseity.

      So as CMP mentioned, we need to decide which bullet God needs to bite. Are His actions necessitated or arbitrary?

    • Curt Parton

      This is a fascinating post and thread. I really don’t have time to interact much, but I do want to offer a few brief thoughts:

      — The fate of those who seem to never be reached with the Gospel is something that even many Calvinists debate. To assume that Arminians have a problem with God sovereignly determining where someone is born, when they are born, and into which family they are born, is to misunderstand and mischaracterize Arminianism. Most Arminians believe that predestination [often distinguished from election] is based on divine foreknowledge. This is not a problem at all for the Arminian from an Arminian perspective.

      — Our perception of choosing freely doesn’t constitute a free choice. Someone who has been captured, abused, and programmed to act and react in certain ways thinks that they are choosing freely, but their perception is incorrect. That’s why when it can be confirmed that their choices were in fact not free, in a legal sense, they are not held responsible for their actions. We can manipulate children into choosing what we want while thinking they are choosing freely. Is this kind of manipulation and coercion what we want to attribute to God?

      — I think CMP’s post shows a misunderstanding of libertarian free-will, but others are addressing that.

    • For a strong treatment of the typical Calvinist philosophical objections to libertarian free will in defense of LFW, I highly recommend J.C. Thibodaux’s concise five part series:

      http://arminianperspectives.wordpress.com/category/fallacies-of-calvinist-apologetics/

      God Bless,
      Ben

    • Jake Blues

      Lisa,

      Imagine that you are on a road that diverges. The road on the left is rocky, uneven, passes through mountainous terrain, with many unseen dangers and difficulties. The road on the right is a gentle downhill grade, and is lined with numerous pleasures along the way. The road on the left has, as its destination, the kingdom of Heaven, whereas the road on the right leads to Hell.

      I think we’d agree that no one /could follow/ the road on the left without God’s assistance — it’s impossible for us to walk it unaided.

      I suspect we’d agree that no one /would have any particular desire/ to follow the road on the left — it looks unpleasant, and generally we are prone to prefer comfort, ease, etc.

      I believe that it’s possible to /see/ the road on the left, even if your propensity is to follow the road on the right; ie, you can be aware that there is a road different than the one that you are on. Would you agree with this?

      I believe it’s possible to catch a glimpse of the destination at the end of the road on the right, and to see that it is unfavorable.

      I believe it’s possible to catch a glimpse of the destination at the end of the road on the left, and to see that it is favorable.

      I believe it’s possible to be told that the road on the left is the one that you need to follow.

      Here’s where I bet we diverge (no pun intended) — I believe it’s possible to take a first step along the road on the left. I see no reason why that first step couldn’t be the result of a gentle (or forceful) push, but I also see no reason that it couldn’t simply be a step that you take because of a perceived benefit of that road, a perceived deficit of the end of the other road, a response to the recommendation to follow that particular road, etc.

      I welcome your thoughts on this analogy and whether you think it’s helpful or unhelpful.

    • Jake Blues

      Let me ask my question a different way (and it’s a bit more argumentative, I confess):

      Would you grant that “hearing the Gospel” is in many or most cases a precursor to “having one’s nature changed”? If so, why is that the case? If we can’t act contrary to our nature, then we have a switch that is either set to “following God” or “not following God”. Why doesn’t God just flip the switch for people — eg the people in Turkey that Michael references who are allegedly less likely to become believers by virtue of less exposure to the Gospel? Why don’t believers just pop up everywhere, in totally random places? Isn’t it rather the case that, generally speaking, the expansion of the kingdom follows the preaching of the Gospel?

      This phenomenon makes more sense to me in an Arminian context — if people must make a decision in order to come to faith, then they must be presented with the options of the decision before they can make it. This is the very nature of a decision. If no decision is required — indeed, if no decision is even possible due to the constraint placed on an individual by his nature — then isn’t the process of “hearing the Gospel and responding to it” a charade that God could bypass entirely? Why doesn’t He do so? (Yes, I recognize I’m being unreasonable in asking you to mind-read God).

    • JJ

      We ask, “Does God control the future? Does he control our choices? Does God determine the future?” And when we answer that, as does the Bible, then we have problems. Forget that question for a minute.

      Instead, ask, “Is past history determined?”

      I don’t know anyone who wouldn’t say that history is determined (except sci-fi buffs). I would get quick rebuttal (tho I haven’t made a point yet) that “past history may be determined NOW, but it was freely chosen (or not freely chosen, if you are a strong Calvinist) at the time…. that there may be elements of history that are beyond our control, but that as far as our choices, they were free.”

      In what sense and in what way is past history determined?

      I maintain that history past is determined, and despite some excellent sci-fi to the contrary, can not be changed in any way, other than corrective toward the future. History past, as it were, is set in stone. I think the majority of Arminians and Calvinists would tend to agree with this much.

      “How was history past determined?”

      Well, this morning I chose white and gray socks. I like them. I thought to myself, “I could wear the white ones, but I really like the ones with the gray on it.” And so, I chose. When I did, that choice was determined in all of history. “You could have changed your mind!” Yes, but then both choices would have been determined for all of time.

      If history past is determined, and yet does not violate my choosing, why can not history future be the same?

      JJ

    • Rey Reynoso

      Oh no, I just read the future. Someone is going to decontextualize Paul and quote “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?”

      LOL

    • Ed Kratz

      Am not going to have a chance to catch up here, but I thought that I would add one thing:

      I am sure that someone is going to ask if God himself has true libertarian freedom. The answer is no. There is simply no such thing, as I have argued, since it is a logical impossibility where actual responsible choices are involved. God also chooses according to his nature. God does have a different type of liberty than us, but if you are going to argue that God can choose against his nature, you will be going against the Scriptural witness to the issue.

      For example: God could theoretically lie. But God cannot actually lie because it goes against his righteousness. His immuntability limits what he can do. Yes, it is a self-limitation, but in every given circumstance, God does not have the power of contrary choice when the choice involves an act that violates his nature. And, it must be understood that God’s acts are not arbitrary.

      The same could be said for people. People could theoretically choose B rather than A. But actually, who they are at the time of the choice is going to determine which they choose. Otherwise, who is making the choice. This idea of “will” is not a separate component that has a consciousness of its own. Neither is it an angel sitting on your shoulder. It is YOU and your representative ability to make choices. It is “free” in the sense that you are making the choice.

      There is a mystery as to why and how people are held responsible for their choices even though there are so many outside factors that contribute to who they are at the time of the choice, but this does not alleviate us of the facts that libertarianism is a logical absurdity. Simply put, it produces arbitrary choices or perpetual indecisiveness.

    • Ed Kratz

      Although, again, it must be said… there are a lot of people who are much smarter than me who disagree. AND there are a lot of people a lot smarter than me who agree!

      In the end, this is certainly not an issue of essentiality and is obviously a very difficult one for people.

      Please keep this in mind and be gracious. Keep it safe.

    • CMP,

      Did you see my comment #53? It brings up this issue of God’s freedom and the consequences of denying Him such freedom. Since you deny Him such freedom explicitly in this last comment, could you please address the issues I raised in comment #53? Also, note carefully that I do not deny that God cannot choose against His nature in so far as He cannot violate His own holiness. But that does not speak to all of His choices (e.g. His choice to create the universe or to elect CMP for salvation while passing over his neighbor) so the question is still very relevant. So let’s narrow it down to just one of God’s choices. In God’s choice to create the universe, was that choice random (arbitrary) or necessitated? Or, perhaps, it was something in a category all its own (neither random nor necessitated, but free nonetheless). Did God have no choice but to create the universe?

      God Bless,
      Ben

    • Paul Davis

      CMP,

      I disagree on this one, your example doesn’t hold water for me. If we are nothing more than our influences then how do churches grow in areas where other religions dominate?, there are Christians in the Muslim world. In your scheme that should not happen, because determinism and the external factors would preclude such a drastic choice outside of Divine Determinism.

      My issue with Calvinistic free will is that it’s not free will, it’s an illusion, there is nothing outside Divine Determinism. Because if you don’t have Divine Determinism then Irresistable Grace is simply not possible, I read both Horton and Sproul on this issue and I found their arguments on free will to be full of holes. (Doesn’t mean I’m right, just that I disagree with their conclusions).

      The world is full of people who make choices outside of what we would consider the deterministic factors of their lives. And the stickler here is that not all are Christian or become Christian, it’s hard to see how God would change someone’s habits and not ultimately lead them to salvation which we all know scripture says is his desire.

      -Paul-

    • Paul Davis

      I would also like to add this for both you and Lisa…

      Thank you for not shying away from these types of issues, and thank you for the Irenic approach. It’s incredibly hard to find good honest substantive discussions about topics like this anywhere (that don’t break down into a fire fest), it’s certainly not something you can discuss in Sunday morning bible study 🙂

      I may disagree with your conclusion, but I agree with your approach.

      Thank You!!!

      -Paul-

    • Ed Kratz

      As I said, God has a different type of freedom than us, but this freedom, as you even acknowledged, is not absolute.

      The problem comes when we say that God created the universe out of some sort of compelling necessity. This becomes pantheism. All of us believe that there are choices and these choices are free. The “power of contrary choice”, as I said, when looked at theoretically, is possible for all conscious being. But when you are looking at things actually, everyone is always going to choose according who who they are at the moment. God will be consistantly choosing according to his character, but is not compelled by some outside force or out of necessity. God’s choices are neither arbitrary nor perpetually indecisive. He, like us, is fully responsible for what he does even though his character comes first.

      God certianly could have not created the universe, just like I COULD HAVE not created this blog post. But, as I have said, our choices are based on who we are. And, as Ronald Nash puts it, we will AWAYS choose according to the greatest desire of the moment. Our desires are dynamically changing due to who we are at the moment, due to many, many factors. God’s desires are stable and immutable. His character never changes.

      Free will must be seen differently when it comes to God precisely because he is the ultimate first cause of all things, but not the first cause of himself and there are no outside factors that make God who he is (otherwise he would not truly be God!)

    • Ed Kratz

      You bet Paul. It is nice to have these types of discussions and keep the bigger truth in mind: there is something much bigger and much more important that we all agree about: Jesus Christ!

    • Ed Kratz

      Paul, concerning my example. I think that the exception proves the rule. Why are there only exceptions in these contries if there is true libertarian freedom. Obviously the outside influences proved too much for the mass majority of people living in Turkey. Do they really experience the same opporunity as I did, having a mother who is a very committed Christian, living in a society that is Christian.

      Even the Proverb says, train up a child in the way he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it. Doesn’t this trained child have a greater chance than the one who is not trained? And who determines the parents? Not the child.

      Another example would be the time of Noah. Why, if God is an “equal-opportunity” God did only five people survive the flood? Why where their only five righteous? If you lived at that time, do you suppose you would have been the sixth? Are you not grateful that God did not put you in that situation? Do you really want to argue that they has the same chance to choose as someone living today, in America? Theoretically, yes. Actually, no. The evidence, whether it be now or then, simply will not allow the type of freedom that Arminians need to make their system work.

    • Rey Reynoso

      I should be serious and say that I think there’s some obfuscation of terminology when it comes to matters of libertarian free will. Libertarians aren’t so much Libertarians as they are free willers who believe that free will is imcompatible with determinism. (There are other incompatibalists who are determinists…they just don’t believe in free will.)

      Many Libertarians have no problem with causal freedom; it’s when you say that it’s deterministically causal where the coherence (for them…and me, frankly) breaks down.

      “I will cause you to love me freely.” is incoherent. I (the determiner) am doing something to affect (causality) you (the agent) to decide freely (of the agent’s own volition).

      Someone might say “what about a drug bust set up by the cops” but in such a case, there is still no determinism involved. “I the police officer will establish circumstances in the hopes that you choose to freely sell me the drugs”

      Now someone else might say “Well, we choose because of our greatest desire of the moment” to which one has to ask “so what” and then offer an example.

      A) Let’s say a human, because of their bad childhood of chocolate abuse, now, every time they smell chocolate they desire and act to kill people. Well, okay, their desire was causal, but the agent acted freely. It wasn’t deterministically causal. He gets the chair.

      B) But let’s say this human was hard wired by an evil scientist that every time he smells chocolate, his desire and action is to kill people. Well, now their action is deterministically caused. This guy wouldn’t get the chair; he can say that although it was his hands that did the killing he really couldn’t help it.

      The compatibalist has to figure out some way that the man’s freedom (even if he really really wanted to do the murders in example B) is actually free while doing his actions and culpable. The Libertarian only says “Impossible to reconcile” and that’s it.

    • CMP,

      The “power of contrary choice”, as I said, when looked at theoretically, is possible for all conscious being. But when you are looking at things actually, everyone is always going to choose according who who they are at the moment.

      But this is question begging. It is mere assertion. It also ignores again the problem of Adam’s sin. He was created good and according to you must have chosen according to his nature and who he was at the moment. He was good at the moment he made his choice, so your entire argument breaks down rather badly at this point.

      God will be consistantly choosing according to his character, but is not compelled by some outside force or out of necessity. God’s choices are neither arbitrary nor perpetually indecisive. He, like us, is fully responsible for what he does even though his character comes first.

      So God’s choice to create the universe was a character choice and since God could not choose contrary to His character (which apparently made his choice to create necessary) then God did indeed create of necessity. I don’t see how you have really addressed the question.

      God certianly could have not created the universe, just like I COULD HAVE not created this blog post. But, as I have said, our choices are based on who we are.

      And apparently we have absolutely no control over who we are, so we have no ability to choose or do anything other than what we choose or do. If that is the case then your above assertion that we COULD HAVE done otherwise is non-sensical and seems like plain double talk.

      Our desires are dynamically changing due to who we are at the moment, due to many, many factors.

      True, but irrelevant if our desires do not irresistibly cause our choices, which LFW proponents have always maintained. Much more could be said, but I am almost to the limit.

    • Sam

      Would someone that believes in LFW please prove that they have this power of contrary choice?

      And when it comes to God, do we actually believe that his choices are less than perfect. Why did God create… becasue it was the perfect choice. Saying that God had to create out of necessity misses the boat. God created because it was the perfect choice to make for a perfect being. Why to you impose deliberation to God. Like he would weigh both sides equally. Do you seriously think that he puts together a pros and cons list before deciding?

    • Joseff

      Michael T said:
      ====
      In addition most Calvinists I know will state that because of God’s Sovereignty over all events everything that happens is the will of God. How is this not fatalism??
      ====

      Hey Michael. I wondered this myself too, when I was first learning these things. Here is what I’ve come to understand. Fatalism says that the ends will be accomplished regardless of what happens between now and then. In other words, the “means” to those ends are irrelevant and not factored into the equation.

      But this is not the same as the Reformed/Calvinistic understanding of God’s absolute sovereignty. Good Biblical theology says that God has ordained the ends, but also he has ordained the *means* to those ends. It’s not that people will be saved willy nilly whether they believe or not, or whether we pray or not, or whether we send evangelists or not. But rather, those are all the Ordained means that God has put in place to realize His own ordained ends. That’s not fatalism.

      This relates to your other statement, here:
      ====
      It’s almost the reverse of Calvinism where grace is offered to a few who can’t reject it even if they wanted.
      ====

      See, that’s just it. This is assuming fatalism (ends without a means). Calvinism does not teach that men are dragged kicking and screaming into heaven. That would be considering the ends without the means. What Calvinism says is that God regenerates us, changes our heart, and that new heart is now spiritually alive and has new desires. The new heart desires salvation, and that’s precisely what it gets. That’s quite different than saying salvation is forced upon unwilling people. In short, anyone who is saved does not WANT to reject it. They are saved precisely because they WANT and DESIRE to be saved.

      Which is exactly what the original article is trying to get at. Humans always choose according to their desires. To say otherwise is to say that choice was arbitrary.

    • I think it should be pointed out that Edwardsian compatibilism really amounts to arbitraryness and tautology when crefully examined, as I wrote in a post a while back,

      “This is basic to Edwardsian determinism. The claim is that we always choose according to our greatest desire or strongest motive force. But this claim is not only mere assertion but essentially circular, not really giving us any useful information. How do we know that we choose according to our greatest desire? The Calvinists would say that the proof is in our decision. Whatever we decide is in accordance with our greatest desire or strongest motive force at the time of choosing. In other words, we choose according to our greatest desire and we know that we choose according to our greatest desire because our choice can be defined as that which constituted our greatest desire at the time of choosing, which is plainly circular. Furthermore, such a claim essentially conflates choice with greatest desire or strongest motive force so that we would be right to say that “we choose according to our choice,” which is a mere truism (tautology) and can hardly be denied by either side of the debate. The Arminian does not necessarily deny that one chooses according to his or her greatest desire/strongest motive force, but sees the agent as responsible for determining what that greatest desire/strongest motive force will be. In other words, it is the agent himself that gives weight to one motive over another which constitutes the decision he makes. Nothing irresistibly causes the will to choose one way or another since the will is itself a complete and adequate cause needing nothing outside of its own God given power and capacity to actualize any of several possible volitions in a given situation where alternatives are involved.”

    • Should be “arbitrariness” above.

    • Joseff

      Hey Michael, sorry to address another statement to you, but so far I find a lot of the stuff you say to be interesting and I’d like to respond, lol.

      You said:

      ====
      1. God is fully capable of saving all people.
      2. God chooses of His own free will to instead eternally and mercilessly torture the vast majority of said people who have absolutely no ability to do what is necessary to avoid being tortured.
      ====

      What you must understand about when Calvinists speak of “inabilities” is that there are two types of inabilities that exist. The first kind is a natural inability. For example, I cannot fly, though I may be willing to fly. I lack the ability to do it. So in this case, I cannot do what I would be willing to do, therefore it would be unjust to command me to fly.

      But this is not the kind of inability Calvinists speak of.

      What we are speaking of is what Jonathan Edwards called a moral inability. (Freedom of the Will) A moral inability is that I cannot do something precisely because I am not willing to do it. So while the natural inability is something I cannot do though I’d be WILLING to do it, the moral inability is something I cannot do BECAUSE I am not willing to do it.

      So it’s not that humans are willing to repent and believe the gospel, but unable to. It’s that they are unwilling to do so to begin with. There is no external force from themselves preventing them from repenting and believing. The inability rises from within themselves, from their own will. They are unwilling to do something, so cannot do it. Why? because a person’s will always chooses what it desires to choose.

      If a will has no desire for X, it will never choose for X. It cannot choose for X, because it is not inclined towards X. Hence, has an inability.

    • Paul Davis

      Michael…

      This is hard to articulate!!!

      I see your point, it’s the same point I’ve heard before. God is good if he saves even one, because we all are depraved (The T in tulip). I’ll grant that to a degree, but John 3:36, 1 Timothy 2:4 make me pause on that viewpoint and wonder if Calvinists have it wrong.

      But the core problem is that neither of us know how Noah made his decision to follow God, I don’t know what the external force that caused the agent to make his choice. It was certainly a radical departure for his time.

      But my point is that world history if full of people who have done just that and not in a christian sense either (not denying, just trying to clarify my point). Can you honestly say that across the history of time that the *only* people (was going to say men, but then I’d be sleeping with the dog again) who made radical cultural changes where men of God? and can anyone prove that those men where influenced by external forces?

      I agree with others that we can only choose what is available, but that our choices are truly free and not Divinely Determined. I also don’t see it in scripture, Gen 4:6 is a good example where God gave Cain a choice. And I would say that he took a huge left turn on that one, it could be argued it was already determined by other factors. But I’m not so sure, and it certainly does not seem to make sense in with exhaustive determinism (if that makes sense :).

      Good topic 🙂

      -Paul-

    • jim

      God gives his irresistible call and the elect are saved.

      Lisa, you said”ungenerated person apart from Christ who cannot choose God except for intervention on God’s part”

      A born again chrisitan is regenerated yet we find he still sins and rejects God’s word not to sin. It seems odd that God can accompllish his will to save whom he desires by influence or intervention but THAT regeneration/intervention does not continue through his christian walk. I think because of Free Will. Why bother praying or witnessing if it is all pre-determined. Why as regenerated men & women do we continually make the wrong decisions/choices. If we are truly regenerated by God’s choice then wouldn’t that lead to a perfect sinless life. Why do we continue to battle Satan and his temptations.

      This has been a bit of a ramble on my part….don’t honestly know how to put into words what I’m trying to convey.

      It is a puzzle, thank God it’s not essential!!

      Lord, forgive me, I could be wrong or right or both.

    • bossmanham

      CMP,

      I notice you brought up that “we will AWAYS choose according to the greatest desire of the moment” which I had prepared to address initially until I saw your qualification in the post that you rejected choice 4 (that we choose whatever we desire). However, since you seem to be accepting the Edswardian paradigm I would like to point out that there is no way to show this without arguing in a circle. I could say, “well my greatest desire was to eat an egg this morning, but I chose to eat cereal instead.” The compatabalist would say, “well then your greatest desire was to eat cereal.” You have to assume that Edwards is right directly out of the box, regardless of how adamant I was about wanting to eat an egg. But there’s no way show this, scripturally or otherwise, without assuming his conclusion to begin with.

      Not only that, but Romans 7 seems to explicity argue against this notion. “For what I will to do, that I do not practice; but what I hate, that I do…For the good that I will to do, I do not do; but the evil I will not to do, that I practice” (Romans 7:17b, 19). Clearly, here, his great desire to do good does not determine that he does do good.

    • dac

      from a very recent mockingbirdnyc.blogspot.com/ post, a quote from TS Elliot play The Cocktail Party

      Unidentified Guest:
      I have come to remind you- you have made a decision.

      Edward:
      Are you thinking that I may have changed my mind?

      Unidentified Guest:
      No. You will not be ready to change your mind
      Until you recover from having made a decision.
      No. I have come to tell you that you will change your mind,
      But that it will not matter. It will be too late.

      Edward:
      I have half a mind to change my mind now.
      To show you that I am free to change it.

      Unidentified Guest:
      You will change your mind, but you are not free.
      Your moment of freedom was yesterday.
      You made a decision. You set in motion
      Forces in your life and in the lives of others
      Which cannot be reversed. That is one consideration.
      And another is this: it is a serious matter
      To bring someone back from the dead.

    • Sam

      LFW is just a circular. Trying proving that you have the power of contrary choice.

      When it comes to Romans 7, why can he not do that which he wants? If he has LFW he would have the power of contrary choice.

      Congratulations you have just defeated LFW with scripture. Awesome!!!

    • Sam,

      Real quick on your use of Rom. 7. LFW maintains that we sometimes have the power of contrary (or better: alternative) choice. That does not necessarily mean that we have the power to act out that choice. Your comment has to do with post-volition action rather than with the volition itself (whether it is free or not). Also, LFW advocates maintain that one’s freedom is limited by circumstances. If Paul is speaking of the bondage of sin prior to God’s gracious enabling, then that would preclude the freedom to fulfill the law since that has not been made an option to that point. Also, I would point out that Paul is not speaking about the inability to put faith in Christ, but the inability to obey the law. The solution comes in Rom. 8 where we find that one can only obey the law as he or she is empowered by the indwelling Holy Spirit (which one receives through faith). So in that context we can see that no one has the freedom to live for God prior to putting faith in Christ. But once someone puts faith in Christ that person is then empowered to live for God (it becomes a live option), according to Rom. 8 and numerous other passages of Scripture (cf. 1 Cor. 10:13).

      All that to say that Rom. 7 does nothing to defeat LFW when properly understood.

      God Bless,
      Ben

    • bossmanham

      Sam,

      LFW is just a circular. Trying proving that you have the power of contrary choice.

      Maybe in trying to prove it deductively, but it seems far more obvious that we do deliberate, weigh options, and make choices. You would need to show that what seems to be the case actually isn’t.

      Also, moral responsibility seems to require the power of alternate choice. Our legal system is based upon the assumption that we actually do have the ability to choose other than to break the law, and in fact that there is a right and correct choice to be made, and can be made. The reason one is punished for breaking that law is the realization that they should have NOT chosen what they did and could have chosen otherwise. This seems to be the premise behind God’s punishment of those who break His law.

      When it comes to Romans 7, why can he not do that which he wants?

      It doesn’t say he can’t do it, it says he doesn’t. You just read your interpretation into the text. Jumped the gun there on congratulating yourself.

      It seems Romans 7 is indicating that prior to regeneration, our enslavement to evil is so great that even though we may desire to do good, we choose evil anyway. There’s nothing about being forced to do evil in the passage, however.

    • […] Twitter buddy, C. Michael Patton, wrote an excellent article on his blog, Parchment & Pen, addressing the Calvinist understanding of the Free Will debate. […]

    • bossmanham

      And I would second Ben’s more in depth interpretation of Romans 7.

    • joseff wrote,

      What we are speaking of is what Jonathan Edwards called a moral inability. (Freedom of the Will) A moral inability is that I cannot do something precisely because I am not willing to do it.

      And you are unwilling to do it because you cannot possibly be willing to do it. So how does your qualification actually amount to anything different from what was already said?

      I will not be able to comment further until at least tomorrow.

      God Bless,
      Ben

    • Sam

      AP,

      Saying that **LFW maintains that we sometimes have the power of contrary (or better: alternative) choice** seems ridiculous. What it practically says is that we SOMETIMES have LFW. That just shows how bankrupt LFW is as a theory.

      I love the point about the bondage of sin and how that would preclude the freedom to fulfill the law, it seems that all men are under the bondage of sin until and unless God graciously enables them.

      The really awesome part though is that since natural man is under the bondage of sin he cannot fulfill the law. So what he effectively has is the power to pick from a variety of bad choices that is, if this is an instance where he has LFW. Seeing as SOMETIMES man may not have this LFW.

    • bossmanham

      What it practically says is that we SOMETIMES have LFW. That just shows how bankrupt LFW is as a theory.

      No this is a straw man because LFW has never asserted that we have the power to actualize infinite possibilities; rather, as I will continue to state until it sinks in, we have the ability to choose from actual possible choices. I can’t choose to stop the earth’s rotation because I don’t have the power to actualize that choice. But what is within my power to actualize in any freedom permitting circumstance I actually can choose between possible alternatives.

      So all you’re doing is viewing a straw-man as bankrupt, which is fine with me.

      I love the point about the bondage of sin and how that would preclude the freedom to fulfill the law, it seems that all men are under the bondage of sin until and unless God graciously enables them.

      This has been the Arminian position from day 1. It doesn’t negate LFW.

      So what he effectively has is the power to pick from a variety of bad choices that is, if this is an instance where he has LFW. Seeing as SOMETIMES man may not have this LFW.

      You actually just articulated an acceptable definition of LFW, aka the ability to choose things that can actually be chosen.

    • bossmanham

      Sam, I would love to see how you think that moral responsibility makes sense in a world where we cannot actually choose to follow the law.

    • Sam

      Boss,

      Trying to equate our legal system with this seems desperate. For instance, would our legal system hold you guilty for thinking of killing someone? You took no action and told no one of it, you just had a thought of doing it. Could you be found guilty in any court of law here?

      Yet even the thought makes you guilty towards God’s law. You would be considered a murderer.

      I think you guys see that LFW is bankrupt, but you just keep clinging to this idol. You come up with ad hoc definitions of **sometimes** having LFW and other times not. You admit that one in bondage of sin cannot do otherwise than sin. You have put so many holes in LFW that there really is no use in having it even if it were real.

      You do not even realize that you drive a death nail through your precious idol by using Romans 7. Sad, that is what it is just SAD.

    • Curt Parton

      Sam,

      What LFW is asserting is that a “choice” where we can not genuinely choose the contrary is not truly a choice. It is a predetermined outcome. If the unregenerate person can do nothing but reject God—because God has determined it to be so—than there is no legitimate choice involved. Arminians would say that we do, in fact, have this choice when God frees the will through prevenient grace. (Freed will is probably a better terminology than free will.)

      To lighten things up a bit (I don’t remember where I got this so I, unfortunately, can’t give credit):

      Franciscus Gomarus
      Was a supralapsarus
      He deigned to give Adam an excuse

      God had decreed
      Fore-ordained Adam’s deed
      God had pre-cooked Adam’s goose!

    • Sam

      Boss,

      I’ve gone back and read my comments and I never equate LFW with being able to do the impossible, like stopping the earth’s rotation.

      The point that seems to be evading you is that you readily admit that a person under the bondage of sin can only sin. In essence that proves that this so called power of contrary choice is not available to him.

      It seems you want to define LFW as having choices, but that is not the standard definition. You have created this ad hoc definition of LFW, not me.

      By admitting that man in bondage to sin can only sin you have defeated LFW. Congratulations!!! Give yourself a big bear hug and go have a beer.

    • bossmanham

      Trying to equate our legal system with this seems desperate.

      I’m not seeing how this hurts my argument. Of course our legal system isn’t exactly like God’s. That doesn’t mean there aren’t acceptable enough parallels to form an analogy.

      For instance, would our legal system hold you guilty for thinking of killing someone?

      Irrelevant. God’s does. If we are morally responsible for breaking God’s law, and His law includes that the prohibition of the thought of killing someone, then it seems ridiculous to hold someone morally accountable for something they couldn’t not do. How can you account for moral responsibility if we can’t not do what we are necessitated to do?

      Yet even the thought makes you guilty towards God’s law. You would be considered a murderer.

      Agreed. If we can’t not do that, how can we be held morally responsible?

      I think you guys see that LFW is bankrupt, but you just keep clinging to this idol.

      You haven’t been able to show that it is bankrupt. You haven’t even been able to account for moral responsibility on your view.

      You admit that one in bondage of sin cannot do otherwise than sin.

      Just because we lack the power to actualize sinlessness in this life doesn’t mean that we don’t have LFW. It is within ones power to choose not to sin, but ones depravity distorts their whole existence and they choose to sin. Jesus knew the heart of all men, and even the most pious will sin because they will choose evil. I already explained this.

      You do not even realize that you drive a death nail through your precious idol by using Romans 7.

      Show me how I did that, because I remember clarifying that for you. This lazy assertion isn’t adequate.

    • Michael T.

      CMP,
      ArminianPerspectives wrote this earlier,

      “Adam was created “good’ by nature and yet did something that was clearly not “good” in disobeying God. It seems to me that the only explanation is that the power of alternative choice was basic to Adam’s “nature”.”

      I think you really need to address this because to me AP is making an excellent point that if not addressed is fatal to your argument. Did Adam have the power of contrary choice?

    • Sam

      CP,

      Thank you for bringing sanity back- when you said that a choice that one can not genuinely choose the contrary is not truly a choice. Now that is a good standard definition of LFW. You should share that with the other LFW advocates on here.

      Do you see how the admittance that man under bondage to sin can only sin is a problem for LFW? You see if you are correct and not having this power of contrary choice means that there is no legitimate choice involved then how can God judge us under LFW theory on what we do? Unless you mean to imply that all mankind has now been freed from this bondage to sin?

      LFW as a theory is bankrupt and completely against the bible.

    • Curt Parton

      Sam,

      You obviously don’t hold to a LFW position, yet feel qualified to dismiss as incorrect the definition of LFW by those who do. That’s similar to Arminians telling CMP he really doesn’t understand Calvinism! Since you do claim this though [of the definition for LFW], how would you define LFW, and what is your source for your definition?

    • Ed Kratz

      You must remember that most Calvinists are compatibalists, meaning that the believe that there is both divine determinalism and self-determinalism at work. These two combine and give people responsibility at the same time as understanding there are many factors that go into the choices they make that come from the outside, including God’s sovereign choice.

      I don’t believe that God is the active agent in every action. In other words, I don’t believe in meticulous sovereignty where God is determining the action of every moleclule in existence. I do believe that there are many things that are incidental to his plan. In this, there is freedom. However, this freedom is always going to be limited to who we are. There is no outside agent called “libertarian free-will” who is controling our choices. Again, the “will” is simply you. It is the decision making aspect of who you are. It is not a separate mechanism that is transcendent to you and your passions, personality, and experience. It works in and with those things because it is based on those things.

      Therefore, whoever you are at the moment of the choice determines who choice is being made. This should not be to outstanding for people to recognize. Who you are at the moment is based on many things. Personality, culture, DNA, circumstances, and family. As I said before, this is evidence that those at the time of Noah had less of a chance at accepting the truth than we do today. Why is that if we had equal opportunity? (one of the primary motivating factors behind Libertarian freedom.)

      Influences need to be considered as well. We need to understand how powerful they are. Take Eve in the garden. Why did she sin? The text seems to imply that it was the temptation and arguments of the snake that led her in that direction. Adam then blamed Eve. God seems to acknowledge all these factors, even though he held both Eve and Adam responsible for their actions.

      Remember, the potter shaped both the vessels in Rom. 9. One for honorable use and one “prepared for descruction.” This evidences quite a bit of divine determinalism. The objector in Rom. 9 says, “Why does he find fault. For who resists his will?” The very question that many of you are asking (and me too!). In the end, the answer is not given. All we know is that God does still hold them responsible.

      At this point you can either reinterpret many many things to make it more palatable (which is very understandable) or you can say it is a mystery: God is good, sovereign, just, and we are responsible. We simply don’t know how they all work together. We just know they do. I think that this accounts for the biblical data the best. As well, it is consistant with a philosophical necessity with regard to freedom (i.e. true libertarian freedom cannot exist).

      Could I be wrong. Are you kidding? Absolutely. It is simply the best way I know how to explain it right now and all other options, in my opinion, don’t work and create more problems than they solve.

      However, some of you guys are much smarter than I am. You may just know something I don’t!

    • Michael T.

      Joseff
      Re: 74

      I almost laughed when I read your post because you state emphatically that Calvinism is not fatalism and then go on to argue that God has determined the “ends as well as the means” which is a textbook definition of fatalism. Of course God doesn’t save people willy-nilly because He has determined long beforehand who he will save and has ordained that those people will behave in a certain way. For instance John Piper once stated that when we pray we are praying because God has ordained us to pray and has predetermined what those prayers will be and how he will respond to them. Your actions whether they relate to being saved or going to the bathroom have been predetermined and ordained by God from the beginning of time thus making any appearance of free choice an illusion. This IS fatalism by definition.

      As to inability I am in fact speaking of the type of inability Calvinists are speaking of, not the type that says I can’t fly. The type of inability I refer to is the same type that keeps the robot I programmed from turning left at the intersection when it theoretically could have turned right. It’s programming wouldn’t let it. Which is why I say humans in the Calvinist worldview are essentially glorified computer programs.

    • Ed Kratz

      With regard to Adam, people are divided. Even in the Arminian camp. It is one of the biggest theological mysteries as to why Adam sinned. No one knows what his moral disposition was before the fall. Some say that he had true libertarian freedom and was the only one. However, this suffers from the same fate that was discussed above. Some would say that Adam was morally nutral without libertarian freedom. In other words, Adam had no past or genetic disposition toward either good or evil. Therefore, outside influences were the primary factor in determining his direction.

      Some say that he was a “vessal of wrath” that God created and allowed to fall (hense the allowance of the snake in the Garden) so that God’s redemption could be accomplished through Christ. In this, we would take a definite step away from moral nutrality toward being children of God in a way that Adam was not.

      Does anyone know? No.

      The biggest question (mystery) for BOTH sides (with regard to our current conversation) is why did God allow the snake to be in the garden influence man. Again, the narrative suggests that the snake provided the turning point in Adam’s morality.

    • Curt Parton

      Thanks, Sam. (Although I think the others were doing just fine without me 🙂

      It all depends on what you mean by God’s judgment. For instance, under the Old Covenant, a person would be judged for murder or adultery. Can an unregenerate person choose not to commit murder or adultery? Of course. But can they free themselves from sin? No. Jesus showed this decisively in the Sermon on the Mount.

      If we’re speaking of God’s ultimate, eternal judgment, I believe that we are judged for our refusal to believe. And I also believe that God, at some point, frees our will to embrace the truth or reject it. If we reject Him, we condemn ourselves.

      I don’t see how what you’ve said calls LFW into question at all.

    • Ed Kratz

      Michael,

      Falalism, by definition, does not have any outside determining factors. The introduction of God and his plan into a worldview makes fatalism impossible. Fatalism only works in an atheistic worldview.

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