It is no secret to most that I hold strongly to the Reformed doctrines of grace. But it is equally no secret that I have deep respect for the godly character and scholarship of many of the Arminian persuasion that believe differently than I. The issues that unite us a greater and more substantial than those that divide us. In other words, the Calvinism/Arminianism divide is over non-essential issues in my opinion. What I am saying is that this article is in no way meant for to put an essential line of demarcation concerning the issues of Calvinism and Arminianism. However, just because something is not essential does not mean it is not important. Therefore, I continue to write on these about such.
Yesterday, I wrote that I believe that the doctrine of Prevenient grace is the Achilles heel of Arminianism, Catholicism, and Eastern Orthodoxy (although, less so with Eastern Orthodoxy and Catholicism since they don’t have such a strong stance on depravity). Prevenient grace literally means “grace that comes before.” Prevenient grace is the Arminian counter to the Calvinistic doctrine of Irresistible grace.
It is important to note at the outset that both Calvinists and Arminians believe that people are born sinful. To make this a little more clear, both sides agree that all people are born with an inherent disposition of antagonism toward God. Both Calvinists and Arminians reject what is know as Pelagianism. Pelagius, a fifth-century British monk, taught that people are born neutral, neither good nor bad. Pelagius believed that people sin as a result of example, not nature. Augustine, the primary opponent of Pelagius, responded by teaching that people are not born neutral, but with a corrupted nature. People sin because it is in their nature to sin; they are predisposed to sin. Both Calvinists and Arminians agree with Augustine believing the Scriptures to teach that people are born with a totally (radically) corrupt spiritual nature, making their disposition toward God perpetually antagonistic. Therefore, according to both sides, people are absolutely helpless without God’s gracious, undeserved intervention. This is an important mischaracterization of Arminian theology that adherents to my position often fail to realize. Arminians believe in the doctrine of total depravity just as strongly as Calvinists. In contrast, Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholics both hold out some sense of natural ability. Therefore, they don’t believe that the will is as depraved as traditional Protestants.
This adherence to total depravity makes the Arminian doctrine of Prevenient grace necessary. A former Wesleyan theology professor of mine who believed in Prevenient grace once called it the “ingenious doctrine.” Why? Because according to Arminians it allows them to hold to the biblical position of total depravity, yet also allow true free will. You see, according to Calvinists such as myself, if people are in such desperate condition, being inclined toward enmity with God from birth, and unable to change their condition on their own (as a leopard cannot change its spots – Jer. 13:23), having no “free will” to choose against this depraved nature, then the only way to answer the question, How is anyone saved? is to answer that the will of God saves them. In other words, if our will could not change our disposition, then God must have changed our will. Up to this point, both Calvinists and Arminians agree. But the Calvinist will say that God’s intervention is radical. In our depraved state, God comes into our lives and opens our eyes to His beauty. This intervention happens by means of saving or “irresistible” grace. In our helpless and antagonistic position, while shaking our fists at God, God sovereignly and autonomously regenerates us. Once regenerated, we trust and love the Lord because our nature has been transformed by Him. Therefore, God is the only one to credit for our salvation seeing as how we did not play any part in its genesis (this is sometimes referred to as monergism). But, according to Calvinists, God does not give this gift of saving grace to all people, only the elect. Otherwise, all would be saved.
How do Arminians deal with our depraved condition? Well, they reject the Calvinistic doctrine of “irresistible” grace believing that it does violence to the necessary freedom that must exist for God to have a true loving relationship with man. But something, nevertheless, must make belief possible. In comes Prevenient grace. This is an enabling grace that comes to the aid of all people so that their disposition can be made capable of receiving the Gospel. It does not save them as the Calvinist doctrine of irresistible grace, but it makes the savable. In essence, Prevenient grace restores people to a state of ability. As Adam before the fall was not predisposed toward a willful rejection of God, being able to make a true free will decision, so people, once affected by Prevenient grace are brought dispositionally to Garden of Eden type conditions. God’s grace comes to the aid of all fallen sinners restoring freedom of the will. Now, it is up to the individual to make an unbiased untainted choice for or against God. Voila! With the doctrine of Prevenient grace, total depravity and true freedom can be harmonized. Ingenious, right?
I agree with Calvinist commentator and theologian Tom Schreiner that “Prevenient grace is attractive because it solves so many problems [for the Arminian] . . .” but I also believe that it creates more problems than it solves. I am going to briefly list the two major problems that I see with the doctrine of Prevenient grace, but I, as always, want to remind you that there are many great men in the history of the church and in contemporary Evangelical philosophy and theology that do not see things the way I do. I encourage you to seek out their position from them in addition to reading my analysis.
1. Lack of Scripture: The biggest issue that Calvinists have traditionally had with the doctrine of Prevenient grace is its lack of biblical support. Tom Schreiner’s quote above is incomplete; it concludes with this, “. . . but it should be rejected because it cannot be exegetically vindicated.” While Prevenient grace may solve problems and allow Arminians to hold to a biblical understanding of depravity, the biblical support for the doctrine is very difficult to find. Most Arminians would agree that direct and explicit support from Scripture is not there, but they would say that the concept is necessitated from other explicit teachings. Most importantly, God commands and desires that all people are to repent of their sin (Acts 17:30, 2 Pet. 3:9, et al) and holds them responsible if they do not. This assumes that “all people” have this ability, otherwise God’s desire is hopeless and His command is useless. While there may be some mystery in the fact that God desires the salvation of all and commands all to repent, this does not necessitate nor justify, in my opinion, the insertion of a fairy complected and even more mysterious doctrine of Prevenient grace. In other words, it could be conceded that God commands all people to repent because sin is at issue. People have violated God’s law. This necessitates God to act as God in accordance with His righteous character and reveal the violation of sin, even to those who have no ability to change on their own. In this case, God’s command is true and genuine. Even if no one were to respond, their sin is made manifest and God’s righteousness is exposed through God’s command. It can also be conceded that God does truly desire the repentance of all people, even if people do not have the ability to repent. God’s desire in this case is mysteriously not going to be an active agent in bringing about the salvation of some. Why? I don’t know. But my ignorance in this matter does not justify the implication of Prevenient grace. God can passively desire things that He does not actively will to come about.
2. It does not really solve any problems: Lets assume that we could overcome the difficulties of the lack of Scriptural support of Prevenient grace. Let’s say that I give the Arminians the benefit of the doubt and say that it is possible to interpret the biblical data in such a way that all people receive an enablement that neutralizes their antagonistic disposition toward God. God then would come to each person sometime in their lives and graciously restore their will to the point that they don’t have any predisposed inclination toward rejection or acceptance of the Gospel. What would this look like?
First, this “balancing the scales” of the will makes any choice, good or bad, for God or against, impossible. Why? Because each person would be suspended in a state of perpetual indecisiveness. They would have no reason for choosing A rather than B. Even Arminian theologian Roger Olson admitted to this in a recent post: “One thing I wrestle with about Arminianism is the mystery of free will. I don’t know how it works. There does seem to be an element of uncaused effect in it” (source). If there is no reason to choose one over the other, then all choices, if they were made, would be completely arbitrary (“uncaused effect”).
You see, we make choices according to who we are. If “free will” of the Arminian variety is going to be responsible for making the choice, and this will is neutralized by Prevenient grace, then there is nothing compelling you (character, upbringing, disposition, the Holy Spirit, genetics, etc.) to make any decision whatsoever. Who you are, the primary factor behind every choice, is taken away. There is no “you” to make the choice. It is arbitrary. It does not solve the “loving relationship”problem to say that God is pleased to have a relationship based upon the arbitrary decisions of people. Therefore, in order to hold to the doctrine of Prevenient grace, one is left with either perpetual indecisiveness or an arbitrary choice. Neither of which solves any problems.
Not only this, but lets do the math. Prevenient grace neutralizes the will, making the will completely unbiased toward good or evil. Therefore, this restored “free will” has a fifty-fifty shot of making the right choice. Right? This must be. The scales are completely balanced once God’s Prevenient grace has come upon a person. What would you expect to see if this were the case? Well, I can flip a coin and pretty much expect that the coin would land on heads just as many times as tails. The same should be the case with salvation. You should expect that just as many people to trust the Lord as those that don’t. But just a cursory look through Scripture tells us that this is not the case. For the most part the number of unbelievers has been dramatically higher than that of believers. Take the time of the flood for instance. How is it that out of millions of people (probably much more), there was only one who was found to be righteous? That would be like me flipping a coin a million (or more) times and it landing on tails 999,999 times and only landing on heads once. Impossible. Christ even explicitly said that there will be and always have been many more people who don’t believe than those that do (Matt. 7:14). How can this be if Prevenient grace created a situation of equal opportunity for all people? It can’t.
Now I don’t want to be accused of building a straw man here so I will attempt to represent how Arminians would respond to this. They would say that the contributing factors that influence people’s freedom are those in the outside world. As the snake came from the outside and influenced Adam’s otherwise neutral will, so also outside influences such as culture and family influence people’s will. Therefore, in the time of Noah, the reason why there was only one righteous person on the earth is because the culture had become so corrupt that God could not be found. This is why God destroyed everyone with the flood. This makes some sense, but in reality it simply re-introduces the same problem that Arminians are desperately attempting to avoid – divine unconditional election.
Let me explain. If outside influences play such a large role in influencing Prevenient-grace-restored-people in their choice for or against God, doesn’t that make God the determining factor in whether they are saved or not? If you had a choice, knowing that outside influences were going to play such a big role in the decisions you make, would you want to be born to a family of believers who teach and live the Gospel in a culture of believers that do the same, or would you rather be placed in a committed Muslim home in a Muslim country where the Gospel is unable to give a testimony of God? In other words, would you rather be placed in a Garden with the snake or without the snake? Of course you would say you want to be placed in the environment where the outside influences for belief in God would be most prominently exemplified. Why? Because you have a better chance. Maybe the odds are not perfect, but they would still be much better. Let’s face it, if you were in the preflood world at the time of Noah, as nice a person as you are today, I seriously doubt that you would have followed Noah rather than the rest of the world.
The problem is that you do not decide where you live or when you will be born. You do not determine your outside influences, God does.
Acts 17:26 26 And He made from one man every nation of mankind to live on all the face of the earth, having determined their appointed times and the boundaries of their habitation.
This passage tells us that God determines the outside influences that are the ultimate influence, the determining factor, in our choice. God chose where you would be born, when, and to what family you would belong. Therefore, God’s sovereign unconditional choice is still the ultimate and determining cause in our salvation. This is the very problem that Arminians seek to avoid with the doctrine of Prevenient grace.
If Arminians were to respond by saying that God gives more grace to those in the most depraved conditions, this would not explain why it is that people in cultures and families that are godly have a higher percentage of believers. We are back to flipping the coin. It does not work either way.
In conclusion, I don’t believe that there is a reason for to entertain the doctrine of Prevenient grace outside of a presupposed view of what some believe must be in order for the truth to be palatable. More importantly, since it really does not solve any problems, it is, in my opinion, superfluous and confusing. Even if it may seem more palatable to say that all people have equal opportunity to accept the Gospel, the palatability of a doctrine does not determine its veracity. This is why I reject the doctrine of Prevenient Grace.
Whether you agree with me or not, I hope that I have been able to give you an appreciation of why Calvinists such as myself have issues with the libertarian freedom inducted by Prevenient grace.
360 replies to "Why I Reject the Arminian Doctrine of Prevenient Grace"
WM,
I’m not really sure what you are getting at. No Arminian worth their salt would say that God didn’t create this universe with this set of physical laws, etc. The only thing I can see Molinism adding to this is that it increases the level of God’s control over the events of this universe because he chose to create this universe instead of another universe. The question is how does God creating universe X instead of universe Y undermine free will? The only argument I could see here is that his foreknowledge undermines free will, but that has already been addressed I think. I wouldn’t see how middle knowledge would be any different.
P.S. I’m actually trying to learn about Molinism through this discussion and correct any misunderstandings I may have of it. So if I’m misreading Molinism somewhere please let me know as it is not the position I personally hold, though I am intrigued by it.
Michael, when you say “No Arminian worth his salt…” I certainly agree with you, and I’m not sure where I managed to miscommunicate THAT. I affirm (with you) that Arminianism and Molinism are Christian doctrines and are not heretical.
You say that Molinism increases God’s control. This isn’t correct; it can only possibly decrease God’s control, because it asserts that some logically possible worlds are not actualizable by God strictly because man’s free will won’t allow that creation. This is the only function of “middle knowledge” in this system.
You next ask why Molinism undermines free will. It does this by asserting that the choices of a soul are a product only of past circumstances and the nature of the original soul itself. By creating a soul and then changing the soul’s circumstances, God can completely determine its choices (within certain limits set by the soul itself). According to Molinism, neither God nor the soul can change the nature of the soul (although God can decline to create a logically possible soul).
This has nothing to do with God’s foreknowledge in the sense we saw with the modal fallacy; Molinism contains a hypothesis about the nature of free choice: that it is completely knowable simply by knowing everything about the soul and the circumstances, even if the soul didn’t actually exist. Since the soul didn’t actually exist in the “second moment” of God’s knowledge, this implies that the soul couldn’t possibly be the nondeterministic cause of the choice that God knew would happen if He actuated that timeline.
Craig denies this, but his denial is logically incoherent, since he ignores the fact that a nondeterministic cause that doesn’t exist cannot possibly have determinate consequences.
Molinism thereby excludes the possibility of LFW.
-Wm
WM,
Again this is just my understanding. I really wish we had a molinist in here who could better explain things since neither of us hold the position.
1. My understanding of Molinism is that it isn’t that some universes are not actualizable because of human free will. God certainly could’ve created a universe without free will. He could’ve created a universe without humans for that matter. The issue is that if God chooses to create a universe where humans have free will that will limit the logically possible universes He could create. This seems fairly obvious because anytime you add a neccessary charateristic to a set of options(e.g. the shirt I’m going to wear today has to be red) you are going to end up with less options (and as Perry pointed out there are some universes God can’t create simply because God can’t do that which is logically impossible like create a square circle or a rock so big He can’t lift it). This doesn’t seem to me to limit God’s control since He chooses to create a universe that has human free will in the first place.
2. A) Do you have a citation about all actions being determined by past circumstances and the nature of the soul? and B) is this a neccessary component of Molinism, or something believed by some of Molinism’s adherents?
You asked for a citation… For a source, read the post I linked to above, by Dr. Craig. There’s a lot of fine points in it, but the main things to take away for our purposes are visible in the following quotes:
* … “counterfactuals of creaturely freedom” have fully specified circumstances in their antecedents. Such counterfactuals have the form “If agent S were in circumstances C, then S would freely do action A.”
* [S] can choose one way or the other; but he will choose one way. If he were in C, he would freely choose A, though he could choose not-A instead.
See what he’s doing? He’s admitting that in the world God actuated, agent S will (with total certainty) actually perform action A. This is a logical certainty derived from the two variables S and C, both set by the will of God. Note that this is NOT a matter of what God knows; it’s simply a result of S and C; and in the final analysis, it’s a matter of what God has actively done. God acted causing A to happen when He could (by changing C and/or S), have had non-A happen instead.
This is not logically compatible with LFW, because in the final analysis God’s will is the entire reason why S and C exist in the relationship that will require A to ensue.
Dr. Craig attempts to escape this by discussing how S “could” do non-A; but in fact S cannot and will not in any case do that, because God’s action in actuating that world ruled out the agent doing non-A.
-Wm
Michael, you’re talking about logical possibilities. God knows all logical possibilities in His natural knowledge, which all theists agree God has. That’s not what I’m talking about.
Molinism says (in agreement with LFW) that God cannot control the choices of free-will creatures. However, they also say that God does have a specific plan for the world in which all things, including all actions of free-will creatures, fit; and that this plan was logically prior to the creation (and wasn’t simply a reaction, as though God created and then said “oh, I didn’t know that would happen!”).
To allow both to be true, Molinism supposes that God must be able to know which alternate timelines can NOT host the actions He wants to occur, because they have a free creature in circumstances where he won’t freely do that. Then God knows that such a timeline can’t be the right one to create.
But this means that Molinism disagrees crucially with LFW, because LFW says that what I do must be up to me in a particular way; Molinism says that it is actually vetoed by God, to the extent that He avoided the realities with any actuality that you’d do otherwise.
-Wm
WM,
I think I see what you are saying. However this statement still bothers me somewhat.
“But this means that Molinism disagrees crucially with LFW, because LFW says that what I do must be up to me in a particular way; Molinism says that it is actually vetoed by God, to the extent that He avoided the realities with any actuality that you’d do otherwise.”
I’m just not sure how this undermines free will anymore then the fact that this universe was created with certain physical laws undermines free will (e.g. I can’t choose to jump off the Empire State Building and survive). I mean I agree with you here that it does, I’m just not sure how. God simply chose to create this universe out of an infinite number of logically possible universes knowing and desiring that in this universe I would freely choose to have this conversation with you.
Now I agree that Craig’s articulation of things (if this is in fact his understanding) is ultimately deterministic and runs into the same problems as any other deterministic system. Despite this I have a friend who is a philosophy major. He seems to articulate Molinism in a less deterministic manner then you’ve described with Craig. At it’s base, in his articulation, Molinism seems to simply be a combination of two things. 1) God having foreknowledge/middle knowledge of all the free choices that would be made in any given logically possible universe, and 2) God choosing to create this universe over any other logically possible universe.
Now if that understanding of the base elements of Molinism is correct then I fail to see how they would undermine free will. I guess I’m just kinda confused….
“I’m just not sure how this undermines free will […] I mean I agree with you here that it does, I’m just not sure how.”
I’m confused… You say here that you agree that it does, but below you say that it doesn’t.
“Now I agree that Craig’s articulation of things (if this is in fact his understanding) is ultimately deterministic and runs into the same problems as any other deterministic system.”
Have you read Craig’s article? He’s defending Molinism there against charges of determinism. That’s why I chose that article. The problem is that the defense fails, because God’s actions are performed in order to utterly determine (define, delimit, make unique) all future events. It’s true that Molinism doesn’t assume physical determinism; but it does assume metaphysical determinism, because God is able to make metaphysical choices in creation which make our entire timeline utterly fixed and immutable.
“At it’s base, in his articulation, Molinism seems to simply be a combination of two things. 1) God having foreknowledge/middle knowledge of all the free choices that would be made in any given logically possible universe, and 2) God choosing to create this universe over any other logically possible universe.”
The distinguishing feature of Molinism against LFW is that God can actuate, from His will and knowledge only, a universe in which “free” creatures will choose in ways that God decides are most appropriate.
The distinguishing feature of Molinism against compatibilism is that God cannot actuate any universe He wishes, but rather is limited in what souls He can create: for example, He might not have been able to create a universe containing man in which the first Adam chose not to fall, or perhaps He might not have been able to create a universe in which Christ went to Calvary and his foremost apostle didn’t deny Him. (Those are random unsupported speculations, of course.) Compatibilism says that God can design souls…
(Wow, I do not like how the new site design works! As I was saying:)
Compatibilism says that God can design souls in any way He wishes, so that the souls choose what they wish in full accordance with what God wishes. Molinism denies that God has any power to design the souls He creates; He can only create them and accept the way they are.
Molinism is, in a very profound sense, compatibilism that works only some of the time. According to Molinism, God can, most of the time, cause free creatures to will what He wants them to.
“Now if that understanding of the base elements of Molinism is correct then I fail to see how they would undermine free will. I guess I’m just kinda confused….”
The souls God creates are free only in the sense that God didn’t design them. They are absolutely deterministic in the sense that a knowledge of their metaphysical essence plus a knowledge of their circumstances allows a complete calculation of what they will choose, without any input from them (because they do not exist except as conceptual information). God is permitted in Molinism to design their circumstances, but He is not permitted to design the souls.
There are no grounds for Molinism’s denial of that power to God. It’s simply unwarranted and irrational to speak as though that somehow constitutes freedom for the creature. If you claim that God is obligated to create us with the ability to do otherwise if we are to be held morally accountable, then Molinism is not a sufficient account.
-Wm
WM,
The reason I said I agree that Molinism undermines LFW and then went on to indicate that it doesn’t is because my gut feeling is that it undermines LFW, I’m just not sure how to prove it logically. As to the rest of the stuff you wrote – I’m a bit busy and will look at it and try to understand it when I get a chance so keep an eye out for my response.
WM,
Quick thought – tell me what you think.
WLC holds to the A-Theory of time. Now on the A-Theory of time, at least in my understanding, the future is actually created as the events occur. In a real way the future doesn’t exist yet for anyone, including God. If this is true it would seem that in order for God to have exhaustive foreknowledge of the future determinism would have to be true. If determinism wasn’t true God could not know what free will choice free agent A would make given circumstances X and time Y (He may have some probablistic understanding, but not actual knowledge). Thus it would seem that on the A-Theory of time either some type of mechanical determinism must be true, or open theism of some type is true.
What you say above seems true. I think I missed A-Theory when I was thinking out loud above.
-Wm
WM,
Thx for the response. While I may not understand Molinism yet (at least in all its possible forms – still reading when i have time) I think I at least understand open theism better. If one rejects determinism, but accepts the A-Theory of time it would appear to me at least that open theism is the only logical possibility (don’t agree with them of course – but better understanding something is always good).
Wm tanksley,
Thanks for the correction. I meant to type “logically possible.” Good eye.
As for the reasons why a Calvinist would reject a Molinist gloss, ISTM that one would do so out of a commitment to a more voluntaristic view of divine volition. That though by itself doesn’t imply that one view glorifies God more or not. All views place some kind of limit on omnipotence.
Something else to keep straight, the soul is not the person. In Molinism the person is an essence or haeceity within God as an idea. Craig (and Moreland) seem confused on this point which lead the to adopt an explicitly Apollinarian Christology. If the person is the soul and Christ has a human soul then Christ would be two persons (Nestorianism). So they adopt the thesis that Christ has no human soul. So much for defending historic Christianity.
In your reply to Michael, I don’t think Craig’s account fails to work because things occur as God knows that they would. One would need an argument to show that Craig’s account of *knowledge* implies a deterministic causation. But God knows lots of things he does not cause, namely his own existence for one. The reason why his account doesn’t work is because of the relation of the essence to the person’s action. If we make that relation indeterministic, then middle knowledge isn’t possible. Open Theists I think have been right to exploit this move, but they’ve taken it in the wrong direction. The lesson isn’t that God can’t know indeterministically caused events, but that God’s knowing isn’t within the realm of being in the first place.
To be fair to Craig, while I reject Molinism, when you write that an indeterminsitically caused event can’t have a determinative consequence, this is false. This is why there is a difference between the consequence of necessity and the necessity of consequence, that is, the difference between saying, if A occurs, then necessarily B occurs, and saying, necessarily A occurs then necessarily B occurs. Again…
Wm.
To be fair to Craig, while I reject Molinism, when you write that an indeterminsitically caused event can’t have a determinative consequence, this is false. This is why there is a difference between the consequence of necessity and the necessity of consequence, that is, the difference between saying, if A occurs, then necessarily B occurs, and saying, necessarily A occurs then necessarily B occurs. Again what is problematic for Craig is what grounds middle knowledge and the relation between the essence and the action.
And it isn’t God’s choices that render our actions inevitable on a Molinist gloss, it is the relationship between the haecceity and person’s actions.
Also, it is important to realize that since Molinism is deterministic, it is at home within a compatibilist/soft deterministic framework. Even compatibilists/soft determinists think that freedom is incompatible with either some forms of determinism or other metaphysical considerations. So they’d accept the idea that not all worlds are accessible to God with respect to freedom.
And Compatibilism isn’t a thesis about God’s relationship to possible worlds. It is a thesis about freedom. The thesis is that freedom and moral responsibility are logically compatible (both can be true) with determinism. Soft determinism entails Compatibilism and further that there is freedom and reality is deterministic.
Michael T.
The Grounding Objection to Molinism is in part an attempt to force Molinists like Craig to face up to the implicit determinism in Molinism. The Objection does so by asking what is the truth maker for propositions about what God knows relative to the actions of agents. It should be kept in mind that Craig’s version of Molinism is more recent and more classical forms of Molinism by Suarez and Bellermine were quite predestinarian. This is why the grounding objection never could come up with their accounts since they endorsed a predestinarian outlook.
Craig does discuss “essences” in his more sophisticated works. He has to, because the Scotistic notion of a haecceity is integral to Molinism and haecceities are essences of persons or individual things.
The difference between the case of natural laws limiting the scope of freedom and Molinism is this. Natural laws may limit the ways I am free, but it doesn’t alter the nature or conditions on freedom. Molinism alters the conditions on freedom since it entails a deterministic relationship between the person’s essence and their actions. That deterministic relationship logically precludes LFW.
A few quick research comments (I don’t have time for more right now).
WLC responded to the Grounding Objection at http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html
TurretinFan gave a critical response to WLC’s argument at http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2007/09/william-lane-craigs-middle-knowledge.html
-Wm
Oh, and I get your point about Open Theism. Yes, it seems to be motivated by a strong belief in both non-deterministic “free will” and the A-Theory of time, together with the admission that once you allow non-determinism into an A-Theory, God has no grounding for foreknowledge.
(If the B-Theory is true, either free will is compatibilistic, or there are multiple actual futures.)
-Wm
Perry, you said: “To be fair to Craig, while I reject Molinism, when you write that an indeterminsitically caused event can’t have a determinative consequence, this is false.”
Could you elaborate on that? I think you meant to, but the comment system cut you off. (I will note that I said “determinate” rather than “determinative”, but I think the ‘iv’ was just a typo in your message, since causes are determinative of effects, not the other way around.)
It seems to me that there is no counterexample to my claim: a counterexample would have the form of an uncaused event with effects, such that the effects were perfectly predictable from the rest of history without having to know about the uncaused event. But in such a situation we’d use Occam’s Razor to say that the “effects” were actually caused by the rest of history, not by the uncaused event, since it was unnecessary to explain the effects.
-Wm
Perry said: “And it isn’t God’s choices that render our actions inevitable on a Molinist gloss, it is the relationship between the haecceity and person’s actions.”
That can’t be right, can it? Our actions only only inevitable given specific circumstances to which our haeccity is exposed; and God’s choices are what put those circumstances in place (not to mention God’s free choice to create or not create a being with our haeccity). Therefore, God’s choices are specifically what render our actions inevitable.
(The above is from the perspective of Molinism as I understand it. I hope I’m understanding the terms correctly!)
-Wm
Perry said: “Molinism alters the conditions on freedom since it entails a deterministic relationship between the person’s essence and their actions. That deterministic relationship logically precludes LFW.”
Ah, that’s a good, short way of saying what I was trying to express. Yes, Molinism (even Craig’s version) says that a choice is determined given history (up to that point) plus the essence of the human about to make the choice.
-Wm
So I have to retract one of my earlier comments about the A-Theory of Time leading to either determinism or Open Theism. I was discussing this with a friend who pointed out that I was assuming that God’s Foreknowledge operates through some intermediary mechanism. He pointed out that this is an assumption that need not be the case. It is possible, as illogical as it may seem, for God to simply intrinsically know what will happen.
Wm Tanksley,
I don’t take Turretanfan to be adequately philosophically informed to warrant a profitable reading of the issues. If you want to recommend literature, I’d start with Flint’s book, Divine Providence: A Molinist Account. There is plenty of literature in Faith and Philosophy, Religious Studies and other journals on the grounding objection
As for causal indeterminism, it is possible to have an indeterministically caused cause bring about a determined effect. Indeterminism isn’t the thesis that there are uncaused effects. It is the thesis that what effects are caused to occur aren’t inevitable given the antecedent conditions.
As for haecceities and Molinism, the actions of an agent are fixed relative to their essence. The circumstances do not determine the actions. If they did, God’s knowledge of our essences would be irrelevant. It is the individual essence that determines the actions since it is the relation of the essence to the act where the deterministic relation obtains and not between the actions and the circumstances.
(The blog didn’t post this comment:)
Michael: “God intrinsically knows” sounds like your friend is saying that it’s in God’s natural knowledge exactly what this real universe is; but that means that the way the universe is now is necessary (intrinsic) to God. That means, in turn, that God had to create the universe this way. I’m sure that’s not what you meant, but I don’t know what you actually meant.
God’s knowledge needn’t have intermediary, but it does have to have grounding (correspondence with reality).
…If you do come back, I’ll be watching this thread via RSS. Why not :-). Or you could hop into Paul’s thread; he’ll be back about the same time.
-Wm
Perry, I think we’re not connecting somehow. It sounds like you’re insisting that Molinism says that circumstances have absolutely zero impact on a person’s actions. That seems like an odd thing to say, since Molinism holds that God can choose which essence to place in which set of circumstances (for example, He could have created me as someone born in AD 800).
Surely you aren’t suggesting that the me born in AD 800 would be performing the same physical actions as the me born when I actually was born?
-Wm
Perry, perhaps you could help me figure this out by rehashing a few things from an earlier post you made:
This is crucially not what I meant; it did not enter into my head that anyone would see a reference to God’s free knowledge of the future. Rather, I intended to refer to the fact that God chooses which creation to actuate based on which creation best fits His desires. It’s God’s choice that determines which timeline is actual, not His knowledge (although His knowledge allows Him to make the correct choice).
I understand that God didn’t necessarily *cause* each human’s choices: rather, God caused the humans and their circumstances. But God did cause the timeline in which they appear, and He vetoed all the alternative timelines (with other choices).
Again, I’m not referring at all to an account of knowledge; I’m referring to an account of creative action. Molinism doesn’t merely propose a threefold division of God’s knowledge; it also proposes a process of deciding how to create.
I see what you’re saying, yes; that seems reasonable.
I don’t understand. Do you mean that there’s no such thing as God’s “natural knowledge”?
(This time my post was almost short enough!)
That’s a paraphrase of what I wrote, and isn’t what I meant. Of course indeterminate events can have effects; but prior to those events, the effects are also indeterminate. I was saying that if the effects are necessary, then so are the things that caused them.
-Wm
Wrong Post
WM,
1. Since I have a small break in the brief I’m working on while it is reviewed by the higher ups I took the chance to listen to some of Dr. Craig’s material and in particular the podcast you mentioned earlier. Now here is how I, with the emphasis on I, understand Craig’s points.
1. The A-Theory of time is true
2. LFW exists
3. God nor past events deterministically cause future events
4. Future indeterministic events still have a true/false value and God knows the true/false value of these future events. (here is where he takes issue with Open Theists such as Greg Boyd)
5. God knowing all logically possible universes chooses to actualize this one over others.
6. By choosing to actualize this universe over another God “weakly actualizes” the events of this universe since He knows what the individuals in this universe will freely choose to do (e.g. by creating this universe over any other and knowing all the free choices humans would make in the universe God is then able to know exactly how the angry mob will freely choose to act at Jesus’ trial even though he has not causally determined them to act in such a manner).
Is my sumary here correct and if so where is it that you believe the flaw in WLC’s reasoning is?
2. … “counterfactuals of creaturely freedom” have fully specified circumstances in their antecedents. Such counterfactuals have the form “If agent S were in circumstances C, then S would freely do action A.”
* [S] can choose one way or the other; but he will choose one way. If he were in C, he would freely choose A, though he could choose not-A instead.
These were quotes you gave earlier to show that WLC ultimately believes in causal determinism. After reviewing these I think you are misunderstanding Craig. Craig here is not making a claim about causal determinism, but rather a claim about the nature of God’s Middle Knowledge that is ultimately no different then the claims classical Arminians make about God’s foreknowledge. Craig is saying that God knows what person A will freely choose to do if presented with circumstances X. Simply because God knows that person A faced with circumstance X will freely choose to do Z does not imply that A was causally determined (by God, antecedent events, or A’s own “essence”) to do Z. I really don’t see the difference between this and the fact that God’s Foreknowledge that A will do Z does not mean that A was causally determined to do Z.
Michael, good to hear from you again; I hope your work is proven excellent by the review.
I’ll address your post #2 first, because it’s crucial to my understanding of #1. The problem with Craig’s claim here is simply that once God determines the existence of person A and the presence of circumstances X (both of which are subject to His veto, by anything except Open Theism), the choice Z is inevitable.
God arguably controls the variable A; at the very least, God could decide to swap person A for person B, and I strongly suspect (admittedly without perfect evidence) that God has enough control over the design of persons to give Him complete discretion over their choices in a given circumstance. My only evidence for this is that if God didn’t have that control, it would seem that God’s choice is limited merely to a veto over which person to create from a countable set of possible persons, and that implies the preexistence of human persons, which contradicts the fact that humans are creations of God, not preexistent.
God also completely controls the variable X. Actually, God has such extreme control over circumstances that it’s essentially useless to attempt to delimit what choices He couldn’t make inevitable for any allegedly free person to make (for example, it is clear that God COULD bring about the mighty signs and wonders that some atheists have claimed would be sufficient to make them believe; and at least for Saul/Paul, He did). In order to get around this, an LFW sympathizer has to make additional claims not present in the Bible or philosophy, such as the claim that God requires or prefers blind faith (this is actually contradicted in the case of Saul/Paul).
Given that God controls both variables, and given that once both variables are determined the outcome (choice Z) is certain, it follows that God controls Z. Claiming otherwise is making up a special definition of “determined” that is useless in any field of endeavor.
-Wm
In response to your post #1: your summary fits with my time-dimmed memories (sorry, I’m not even sure how to find the original to review it).
And the way I’d summarize it is that even accepting all your points other than #6, that final #6 doesn’t seem to follow; it’s entirely ad-hoc to invent a special category of actualization, “weak actualization”, which isn’t previously defined or required by any of the premises. By your own premises, the timeline God actualizes is actualized entirely for God’s purposes; there are no other purposes in existence when God created.
Other than that, everything you say in post #1 is compatible with what a semi-compatiblist would say.
I forgot to make one comment on your post #2. There’s a huge difference between discussions about God’s knowledge of the future and God’s creation. Knowledge isn’t causal; creation IS. Knowledge is grounded in the thing known; creation is the ground for the thing created.
(As a side note, observe that I don’t use the word “foreknown” as a synonym for knowledge of the future; I think it’s used in the Bible to indicate not merely knowledge, but approval at a personal level. See especially Rom 11:2, which makes “foreknew” contradict “rejected”.) This fits with the ancient use of “know” in a deeply personal sense (still preserved in the modern world, of course: “I knew him” doesn’t mean the same thing as “I knew it.”)
Here’s a search for two forms of “to foreknow”: http://net.bible.org/search.php?search=greek_strict_index:4267%20or%20greek_strict_index:4268
-Wm
WM,
1. As a initial issue I wonder if we are working with different definitions of when a choice is free from the libertarian perspective. I have been trying to come up with a good definition myself. I think an appropriate definition is the a choice is free if it is not directly caused by an external force and is not merely the result of antecedent causes and conditions (please note all would agree that the antecedent causes and conditions play a role in making a choice – the point here is merely that they don’t deterministically cause the choice). Now my definition above may be inaccurate or just downright wrong and if it is feel free to point that out.
2. “I strongly suspect (admittedly without perfect evidence) that God has enough control over the design of persons to give Him complete discretion over their choices in a given circumstance.”
I’m not so sure about this. A significant portion of our design is determined by the natural laws of the universe. Thus I think from the Molinist perspective God, on some level, by choosing to create this universe from all the logically possible universes knew that you and me would be born. So while God had the choice to create or not create this universe He to at least some extent didn’t have the choice to create this universe and not have you or me in it (I’m again trying to take the Molinist perspective and could be way off).
3. I’m not quite clear how God knowing what hypothetical person A would freely choose to do if faced with situation X as well as what person A would do if faced with situation Z implies determinism when God chooses to create a universe in which hypothetical person A exists and is face with situation X?? Does God simply “knowing” imply determinism??
4. The link to the podcast discussed in my last post.
http://www.rfmedia.org/RF_audio_video/RF_podcast/Four_Views_on_Divine_Providence.mp3
A splendid question!
I can’t say it’s wrong; but it doesn’t feel sufficient. One danger signal to me is that it’s purely negative; it only says what free choice is NOT. More seriously, I think even libertarian choice is actually an effect of a cause: the cause is a person’s will. The effect is simply not deterministic; that doesn’t preclude it from being an effect (thanks to Perry for clarifying that for me).
Can we start by stealing a page from Inwagen, who says that before one defines a compound abstract noun (he was talking about “libertarian free will”) one should first understand the base noun and the adjectives. How about here we attempt to understand “choice”, and then “free” as it applies to “choice”.
Do you think that’s possible? (I admit that I’m not sure. In fact, one of my doubts about LFW is that it seems to be impossible to define.)
(Sorry. Got truncated again.)
One of the central axioms of Molinism is that souls are not physical, and that God can decide which soul goes into which body. So although the history of the universe might (hypothetically) demand that the body I’m using be born, it doesn’t demand that I be the one to occupy it. And Molinism also demands that souls have control over actions, so if God swapped one of us for a soul who didn’t care about God, we wouldn’t be having this conversation.
-Wm
Simply knowing which one will happen may not imply determinism for God (it would for man); but being able to act to narrow the possibilities down to one prior to the event does imply determinism. The means by which God narrows the possibilities down to one is to choose which soul goes into which circumstances.
A “true LFW-er” would say that even placing a soul in predetermined circumstances isn’t enough; the soul would still be free to choose either way.
(A true Scotsman, on the other hand, would be Presbyterian, and thus compatibilist. Sorry; I have to make dry jokes sometimes, and that’s my favorite fallacy name. This one refers to my inadvertent use of “true LFW-er” above.)
-Wm
1. Still processing your definition of LFW, not sure if I agree or not at the moment – still thought I’d reply to your other stuff.
2. “One of the central axioms of Molinism is that souls are not physical, and that God can decide which soul goes into which body. So although the history of the universe might (hypothetically) demand that the body I’m using be born, it doesn’t demand that I be the one to occupy it. And Molinism also demands that souls have control over actions, so if God swapped one of us for a soul who didn’t care about God, we wouldn’t be having this conversation.”
This kinda gets back to a disagreement we are having here in that I don’t really see Molinism or WLC as saying this anywhere. Where they seem to say this, as noted earlier, I think you are misinterpreting them. Now could a Molinist say this – sure I guess, but I don’t see how it is necessitated by the basic arguments of Molinism.
3. “The means by which God narrows the possibilities down to one is to choose which soul goes into which circumstances.”
Again I could be wrong, but this isn’t what I see Molinism as actually teaching. God narrows down the possibilities by choosing which of the logically possible universes to create. When he chose to create this universe as opposed to another universe he knew that I would exist in this universe and that I would freely choose to have this conversation with you in this universe. Now God’s intervention may change the time line to some extant through his direct intervention by say performing a miracle or sending his Son at a time and place where He knew what would happen, but not by choosing whom to place where at what time accept by His general decree to create this universe over universe X.
By the way, the “blockquote” tag works now. Whew.
No; this is not a distinctive of Molinism. Choosing between logically possible universes is common (in some way) to every theory which includes God’s natural knowledge. Molinism is distinctive because it adds a new level of God’s knowledge which is specifically about counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. As an example of that, it’s logically possible that I would choose to NOT respond to your post; but it’s not actually something that my soul would choose, given that choice. This input to God’s design decisions is what makes Molinism distinctively different.
Yes, but that’s God’s free knowledge, not middle knowledge. By middle knowledge Molinists say that God knew what choices your soul would make in any circumstances you could be put into. ANY ones, not merely the ones He actually created. God used that knowledge to design His creation.
You seem to be claiming that God didn’t have very many choices to make; that all He actually was able to change is raw physical constants. That may or may not be true, but it’s not a claim Molinism cares about. Whether the number of possible universes was small or large, Molinism attempts to explain how God chose the one He created, and it makes some important assumptions along the way (one of them being that there’s only one possible timeline, thus entirely contradicting the hard-LFW worldview).
-Wm
That’s true, though that sort of middle knowledge would clearly be useful in deciding which universe to create.
How so? That is, how exactly does Molinism imply there is only one possible timeline?
I cited WLC above as having responded to the grounding objection. I spent some more time reading http://plato.standford.edu and his article (http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html), and I’m aghast at what I found.
First, almost as soon as he starts into the real argument, he makes the claim that his opponents are relying on a recent development of the theory of truth called truth-maker theory, and he quotes one of the recent developers of that named theory (his footnote 5). What’s not obvious to the casual reader is that the term “truth-maker” is NOT a special technical term in that new theory, but is rather is a term used within the almost universally accepted “correspondence” theory of truth. Craig is blurring the truth to make it look like his opponents are on shaky ground and depending on a novel theory, when they’re actually merely using standard philosophical terminology for one of the more solidly accepted theories of truth (and one that he himself explicitly endorses in his introductory books). Read his article: I don’t think there’s any excuse for what he did there. He’s throwing up a smokescreen of technicalities that don’t apply, and until I read the literature, I assumed he was telling the simple truth.
This one problem alone makes this a really, really bad article. There are other problems in it as well (I was going to complain about the abuse of 1 Cor 2:8, for example), but realistically, those could be overcome by more careful choice of examples. The main problem is deceptiveness that almost amounts to dishonesty.
I respected William Lane Craig. I disagreed with him, sometimes found him incomprehensible to me, and still find him very learned and intelligent. But I can’t say I respect him anymore.
-Wm
WM,
I think you may be confusing the concept of the Truthmaker in the Corresponence Theory with the Truthmaker Theory. This article here lists Truthmaker Theory as a competitor to Correspondence Theory. Granted I only went over it briefly as I’m on the clock again through tommorrow.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#2.2
Michael, that’s exactly why I’m so unhappy with WLC’s article. See the paragraph right after the heading “The Grounding Objection and Truth–Maker Theory”. WLC is pretending that because his objecters use the term “truthmaker” they have to be using truthmaker theory, and WLC explains that truthmaker theory is new and poorly explored, and he specifically states “The theory presupposed by the grounding objection appears to be a certain construal or version of a view of truth as correspondence which has come to be known as the theory of truth–makers.”
He’s being flat-out dishonest there; the theory presupposed by the Grounding Objection is the Correspondence Theory, and the term “truthmaker” is a term of art within that theory.
In fact, I just noticed that he directly quotes Peter Simons refuting WLC’s claim: if the actual Truthmaker theory “does not pronounce on the ontological category of the truth–maker”, that means that truthmakers may indeed be hypothetical, thus allowing for the more complex constructions of WLC’s “true counterfactuals”. The grounding objection seems to suppose that truthmakers must actually exist, which means that a theory which “does not pronounce” on ontological status (existence) cannot be the basis for the grounding objection. It almost appears that WLC should be appealing to Truthmaker Theory for support for his arguments; the catch, I think, is that he’s written books in which he supports the simple Correspondence Theory, and he’s be contradicting himself.
(It’s also frustrating to see WLC call facts “abstract realities” — of course, a fact is concrete, not abstract, even though the word “fact” is itself abstract.)
-Wm
Wade, I’m not saying there’s only one logically possible timeline. Molinism is clear in saying that there are many logically possible timelines, and then fewer logically and psychologically possible timelines, and finally only one timeline which God “actualizes” by rejecting all the other ones.
-Wm
WM,
As I read WLC’s paper it seems to me that he states that his opponents assume Truthmaker Theory even if they do not make it explicit. He then goes on to explain how the concept of a “truthmaker” in Truthmaker Theory differs from the concept of a “truthmaker” in the traditional Correspondance Theory which WLC accepts. Now I’ll be honest here and admit I’m in a bit over my head at completely understanding what WLC is saying and need to do some more reading (I had never heard of Truthmaker Theory before this article) however, it seems clear to me that WLC is not being disingenious here and arguing against something he himself holds. He holds to the traditional Correspondance Theory. Furthermore it is not improper to point out that someones thinking assumes a philosophical position even if they aren’t explicit about it. WLC truly believes that his opponents positions assume the Truthmaker Theory and explains why he believes this (again I don’t have a good enough understanding to grasp the exact difference between truthmakers in Truthmaker Theory and truthmakers and Correspondance Theory, but it seems clear from WLC’s article and the article I linked earlier that there is one). I’m just not sure where the disception you complain of is?? Perhaps you are confused by the term “truthmaker” being used in three different ways (1. The Truthmaker Theory; 2. “truthmakers” as understood in the Truthmaker Theory, and 3. “truthmakers” as understood in traditional Correspondance Theory)?
Could you point out where he does that? I don’t see it, even after a fresh re-reading. He quotes Peter Simons as part of defining Truthmaker Theory, but he doesn’t ever explain how that differs from the standard theory, nor how that pertains to the argument.
I’m baffled. WHERE? This claim is a perfect defense against my accusation of deceptiveness, and my inability to see it is the entire reason I made the accusation. I’ve read Craig’s essay so many times I can almost recite it, and I’ve read the Stanford paper as well (although not THAT thoroughly).
Craig says “Now, as I say, it is a matter of considerable debate whether true propositions do have truth–makers at all. Truth–maker theory is, after all, a minority position…” Here he CLEARLY implies that “true propositions have truth-makers” is something special to Truthmaker theorists, and they’re in the minority specifically for believing _that_. But that’s not true; all correspondence theories hold that; they simply all modify how to search for the truth-maker (for example, the Atomists parse the sentence to find logical atoms which can have truthmakers; classical Correspondence theorists search for truthmakers in a single ontological category; and Truthmaker theorists look in all ontological categories).
I just noticed him citing Restall as though he were giving a special objection to Truthmaker Theory in specific. He may be (I don’t know), but the Stanford article calls this objection the “Big Fact”, and it’s long been an objection to correspondence theory in general.
By the way, after learning all this stuff, I find that my inclination…
WM,
I have to read through this paper a few more times and I need to read through it a few more. I don’t think it is saying or arguing for what you think it is arguing for, but I’m just not sure what he is arguing yet. That being said this paper is one of the least readable things I have ever read and I’ve read numerous Court cases from the Early part of the 19th Century. The problem is that WLC appears to be using the same term to denote different views and he isn’t clear about communicating which view he is referring to when he uses a term. Additionally he doesn’t communicate well when he is arguing for or against something.
Ha! I thought I was over the limit. I should have broken into separate topics. This is a logical splitting point anyhow.
By the way, after learning all this stuff, I find that my inclination was toward Atomism or Subatomism (I’m not certain about the distinction) within a classical Correspondence Theory. That is, I believe that a statement must be parsed and understood before any correspondence to reality may be looked for. This allows for complex statements and even ambiguous statements to bear truth.
So how can a counterfactual of creaturely freedom bear truth? Let’s use a Biblical example that I think is more fruitful than Craig’s example: God speaking about Chorazin.
When Christ cursed the cities of Chorazin and Bethsaida he uttered the counterfactual that IF His works had been performed in Tyre and Sidon THEN they would have repented.
This is exactly the sort of knowledge Molinism depends on; unlike the example Craig chose, this is clearly behavior that is dependent both on circumstance and on the specific people (and in fact, Christ phrases it precisely that way).
So how do I see this as being true, since I disagree with Molinism?
First, I don’t think its main meaning is to reveal Truth about the counterfactual repentance of Tyre or Sidon; when I parse the statements in context I see them as a statement about the actual pride and stubbornness of the Jewish cities, not about any humility of Tyre and Sidon. In other words, I think Jesus was making a true conditional statement that was vacuously true, not one which was intended to reveal deep truths about long-dead cities.
Second, let’s suppose that it did reveal deep truths about long-dead cities. Then its truth was actually grounded in the character of the people living in those cities — although they were evil people, they were honest enough to repent given the opportunity. It’s not a statement that claims that God could have actuated a world in which Tyre could have repented…
(Over limit BADLY. I’m editing this a little.)
… It’s not a statement that claims that God could have actuated a world in which Tyre could have repented (which would be a statement about God, not people); it’s making the claim that the people of Tyre were actually better than the people of Bethsaida.
Christ is making a character judgement, not a pronouncement on divine power.
There’s a similar example when God speaks to David about the city of Keilah; God appears to be stating a counterfactual, and this time He’s stating it as deeply and prophetically true; but it’s grounded in the reality of the character of the people of Keilah, not in God’s ability to know counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.
-Wm
I’m also interested in WLC’s own example of an alleged counterfactual of creaturely freedom. He cites Paul in 1 Cor 2:8, but it seems to me that this is not at all a counterfactual of creaturely freedom; rather, it’s intended as a vacuously true statement that proves Paul’s broader argument — the conditional could NEVER, in any logically possible world, be true. Paul’s broader argument is that God’s truth isn’t understood by man; how could inserting a deep revelation about some specific rulers support that claim? Rather, it’s a shallow revelation about ALL people.
It’s not about creaturely freedom; if anything, it’s about creaturely bondage.
-Wm
To recap, the claim I found questionable was, “Whether the number of possible universes was small or large, Molinism attempts to explain how God chose the one He created, and it makes some important assumptions along the way (one of them being that there’s only one possible timeline, thus entirely contradicting the hard-LFW worldview).” It’s unclear to me how (1) there’s only one possible timeline; (2) how Molinism contradicts hard-LFW (whatever that is exactly).
If libertarian free will is true, not everything is actualized by God; some states of affairs are (at least in part) actualized by humans and God simply knows what humans will choose. Of course, you might object saying that God’s middle knowledge would render libertarian free will impossible, but how would that work exactly? Do you have an argument for that?